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This thesis reconsiders the generally held view that
Friedrich Nietzsche's works are misogynist. In doing so it
provides an interpretation of Nietzsche's texts with respect
to the metaphor "woman," sets this interpretation into an
historical context of Nietzsche reception and follows the
extension of Nietzsche's metaphor "woman" into French
feminist theory. It provides an interpretation that shows
that a misogynist reading of Nietzsche is in error because
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such a reading fails to consider the multiple perspectives
that operate in Nietzsche's texts.
Nietzsche's metaphors of "woman" -- far from being
misogynist -- reveal a positive, affirmative "woman." His
use of this metaphor radically dislocates traditional
conceptions of the relationship masculine/feminine as it
dislocates the "truth" of metaphysics. I argue that the
metaphor "woman" is central to Nietzsche's attack on
traditional philosophy and notions of truth.
Once "woman" is disentangled from notions of misogyny,
I turn to a study of how Nietzsche has been interpreted from
his own time to the present, paying attention to the point
at which the "woman" in Nietzsche's texts acquires a
significance and how this metaphor has (or has not) been
read by Nietzsche's major interpreters. Given that the range
of Nietzsche reception is very broad, extending through
literature, social thought, politics, psychology, and
philosophy, I have chosen to focus on Nietzsche's major
philosophical readers, beginning with Nietzsche's own time
and running through Heidegger and Derrida. This enables me
to set my own interpretation within a context of Nietzsche
reading.
The last major chapter examines the relationship
between Nietzsche and the major texts of French feminist
criticism. My concern here is with the extension of
Nietzsche's strategy of "woman" to radical feminist theory
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in the valorization of "woman" as difference and otherness
and the use of this valorization to attack the patriarchal
structure and history of language and thought. For these
theoretical writers who would deconstruct even sexual
identity, "woman" still functions in the Nietzschean sense
in which she is no longer the opposite of man but the very
subversion of the opposition masculinity/femininity.
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INTRODUCTION
The writings of the enigmatic philosopher Friedrich
Nietzsche have been subject to numerous, frequently
conflicting interpretations during the one hundred years
since he stopped writing, victim to a madness many believed
symbolic of the radicalness of his thought. It is the very
complex nature of this thought that has produced so many
different views and different "Nietzsches.'' Even now, one
commonplace of commentary on Nietzsche is that he was/is a
misogynist however much significance is accorded his
contributions to the thought of the twentieth century.
Nietzsche's famous remark "You are going to women? Do not
forget the whip!" is frequently cited in evidence of this
misogyny. 1 It is part of my purpose to show how this reading
of Nietzsche is the mistaken result of failing to take
account of the multiple perspectives that operate in his
works. There is no other way to show that the label misogyny
does not apply to Nietzsche than to provide an
interpretation of Nietzsche's texts that follows his use of
the metaphor "woman" and his remarks on women. The riddle
posed by "woman" plays a very significant role in
Nietzsche's thought. Those readers who pay attention to this
1 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1978) 67.
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riddle, following Ariadne's thread through the labyrinthine
structure of Nietzsche's writing, will discover therein a
positive, affirmative "woman,'' one that radically dislocates
traditional conceptions of the relationship
masculine/feminine as it dislocates the "truth" of
metaphysics. The question of Woman is posed in the first
chapter of this thesis.
Once "woman" is disentangled from notions of misogyny,
I turn to a study of how Nietzsche has been interpreted from
his own time to the present, paying attention to the point
at which the "woman" in Nietzsche's texts acquires a special
significance and how this metaphor has (or has not) been
read by Nietzsche's major interpreters. I situate my own
reading of Nietzsche in this context as a particular kind of
interpretation. Previously, whether Nietzsche was labeled
misogynist or not, his remarks on women were not believed to
be important enough to be taken seriously philosophically.
They could be ignored or dismissed, while his readers took
on the explication of his "real" philosophy. The literary
aspects of Nietzsche's texts were separated from his
philosophical arguments. However, in French intellectual
thought during the late 1960s and the 1970s the
deconstructive nature of Nietzsche's texts as a kind of
writing acquired significance within the
stucturalist/poststructuralist debate over writing and the
extension of this debate to the philosophical tradition by
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Derrida. 2 The literary nature of philosophical writing as
writing was now taken seriously (or philosophy was taken
more playfully) and the separation between philosophy and
literature rejected.
In the context of this debate "woman" becomes a
metaphor without brakes, proliferating in the texts of
postmodernism as a Nietzschean valorization of the feminine
as alterity and difference over the metaphysical concepts of
identity and sameness. The last major chapter of this thesis
deals with this process of valorization, particularly with
the relationship between Nietzsche and the major texts of
French feminist criticism -- the extension of Nietzsche's
strategy of "woman" to a type of radical feminist theory.
Thus my thesis provides both an interpretation and a
reception history as the context for this interpretation and
its extension to new debates.
The use of the term "postmodernism" requires some
explanation. Jean-Francois Lyotard defines the postmodern as
"incredulity toward metanarrative." 3 This can be expanded by
saying that the difference between the modern and the
postmodern is a difference in the status of the story

2 Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1985) 11.
3 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on
Knowledge, trans. Geof Bennington and Brian Massumi
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) xxiv.
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historical, literary, scientific, or philosophical.
Modernist writers tend to believe and write as if a story
could still be told in the form of a comprehensive narrative
in which meaning has a unity as a whole and in which the
identity, grammar, and vocabulary of literary language are
assumed given. In postmodernist writing such conventions are
abandoned, or if retained, then retained as arbitrary
academic forms. Form and artifice no longer give solace.
Meaning is multiple, no story privileged, nothing has
explanatory power. 4 Throughout this thesis the words
"theory," "form," "nature," "is," "represents," and other
similar words are used. Given a certain academic form and
approach that must be followed, these words are useful and
unavoidable, yet under postmodern assumptions they cannot be
used without irony. This must be kept in mind, particularly
when the "object" of study is a group of texts bearing the
signature "Nietzsche." In postmodernism (sometimes referred
to as modernity) legitimation -- of theory, fact, knowledge
has become "visible as a problem." Nietzsche fore-tells
this twentieth century crisis of representation. 5

4 Lyotard 71-82.
5 By representation is meant "an essentially realistic
epistemology, which conceives of representation as the
reproduction, for subjectivity, of an objectivity that lies
outside it, [and] projects a mirror theory of knowledge and
art, whose fundamental evaluative categories are those of
adequacy, accuracy, and Truth itself" (Jameson, "Foreword,"
to Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition viii).
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At the end of the nineteenth century Nietzsche termed
the first manifestation of this crisis Nihilism. In
Nietzsche's time this appeared as a general cultural
dislocation in a period of great social, political, and
cultural change in Germany and elsewhere. Nietzsche was a
severe critic of the products of these changes -- German
nationalism, anti-semitism, industrialism and the
development of middle class values, philosophical pessimism,
cultural decline, and sterility. Culture was widely believed
to be shallow and decadent. 6 But even more so he was a
critic of the rise of positivistic science and scientism in
the second half of the nineteenth century to the status of
near religious faith. 7 This scientism accompanied a loss of
religious faith on the part of many. 8 Nietzsche repudiates
both the Christian religion and the faith in science as
symptoms of the same problem

the devaluation of this

world for (an)other world, a beyond posited on
God/Truth/Reason which could provide the truths and
certainty lacking to our immediate senses and provide man a
false sense of comfort in his ability to "know."

6 Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: 1840-1945
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969) 393; Henri F.
Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious (New York:
Basic Books, 1970) 281.
7 Ellenberger 226.
8 Holborn 121.
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Nietzsche's contemporaries emphasized the polemical
aspects of his works -- his attacks on culture, morality,
religion, and science. 9 However, it is not Nietzsche's
cultural criticisms that are important here, nor his
relationship to his philosophical peers and predecessors,
but his diagnosis of nihilism as the most pervasive problem
of his/our time. Nihilism here refers to the loss of eternal
standards encompassed in Nietzsche's statement that "God is
dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him." 10 The loss
had occurred and, Nietzsche argued, could not be recovered
by traditional means. Nietzsche, more than his
contemporaries, discerned the future significance of this
loss of values and meaning. As he says further in the
parable of the madman:
I have come too early ... my time is not yet.
This tremendous event is still on its way,
still wandering; it has not yet reached the
ears of men. Lightening and thunder require
time; the light of the stars requires time;
deeds, though done, still require time to be
seen and heard. This deed is still more
distant from them than the most distant Ilars
-- and yet they have done it themselves.

The search for Truth has undermined itself by a process of
internal erosion, even if this erosion had, in Nietzsche's

9 Ellenberger 272.
lO Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Kaufmann (New
York: Random House, 1974) §125; Allan Megill, Prophets of
Extremity: Nietzsche. Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida
(Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1985) xiii.
11 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §125.
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time, not reached the surface or affected the faith in
science. The distant thunder that Nietzsche had the ears to
hear has become close and loud in the twentieth century.
Nietzsche's great problem, as Walter Kaufmann has put
it/ is
to escape nihilism -- which seems involved
both in asserting the existence of God and
thus robbing this world of ultimate
significance, and also denying God and thus
robbing everything of meaning and value ... 12
What new story can be told to affirm life and human meaning
when there are no meanings and patterns in existence itself?
Nietzsche moves away from Schopenhauerian pessimism toward
"a justification of life, even at its most terrible,
ambiguous, and mendacious. 1113 How does one restore the
mythic element to a culture that has become "analytical and
inartistic? 1114 The affirmation of new values requires the
willingness to question all values up until now. Nietzsche
will revalue

-- or reinterpret -- the very idea of truth,

rejecting metaphysics and the mediation of things through
concepts. Nietzsche was not alone in the nineteenth century
in criticizing the idea that concepts do not mediate things

12 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher.
Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1974) 101.
13 Nietzsche, The Will to Power trans. Kaufmann and
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968) §1005; Megill 43.
14 Megill 78.
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and that no immediate knowledge of the world is possible. 15
However, where others attempted to find new possibilities
for mediation, Nietzsche would reject mediation altogether
and argue for the metaphorical nature of thought, language,
and truth -- truth as illusion, as a process of
interpretation that goes all the way down. The recognition
that truth is a matter of interpretation opens the way to a
new creativity -At long last the horizon appears free to us
again ... the sea, our sea, lies open again;
perhaps there has never yet been such an
"open sea."i 6

15 Megill 47.
16 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §343.

CHAPTER I

THE WOMAN IN NIETZSCHE'S TEXTS: AN INTERPRETATION
Supposing truth is a woman -- what
then? Are there not grounds for the
suspicion that all philosophers,
insofar as they were dogmatists,
have been very inexpert about women?
That the gruesome seriousness, the
clumsy obtrusiveness with which they
have usually approached truth so far
have been awkward and very improper
methods for winning a woman's heart?
What is certain is that she has not
allowed herself to be won -- and
today every kind of dogmatism is left
standing dispirited and discouraged.
If it is left standing at all!
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good
and Eyil
Truth, Wisdom, Eternity, Ideality, Philosophy, Beauty
have been woman since the time of the Greeks.
Nietzsche's use of this metaphorical "woman" should not
surprise anyone, except for the unusual, paradoxical twists
he gives her. Nietzsche's use of this and other commentary
on "woman" and her metaphorical presence within
philosophical texts serves to question the traditional
philosophical meaning given to concepts like truth, and
constitutes a major part of his attack on traditional
philosophy. Although we can only interpret these metaphors
through carefully reading other sentences in Nietzsche's
texts that use the same words and following the different
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descriptions and values given them, we can not add up the
various ways in which these words are used and arrive at "a"
single meaning.

In examining their role within Nietzsche's

texts I shall begin with a consideration of these metaphors,
as they appear in Nietzsche's texts and as they embody his
major themes, not, however, as if they are mere figurative
decoration for underlying concepts, but in their own right.
In interpreting Nietzsche's writing it is important
never to take any individual remark out of its context. One
can easily argue the case for Nietzsche the misogynist by
reading only his seemingly more offensive statements
literally or argue the case for a "feminist" Nietzsche by
emphasizing only the positive statements. This is not the
simpleminded mistake that it at first seems, because
Nietzsche's texts are ambiguous and the contexts that can be
applied to his metaphors multiple. The theme of "woman'' in
Nietzsche's texts is intimately bound up with what is called
his perspectivism, his metaphor of the will to power as the
basis of all life, and the affirmation of life as will to
power given in the eternal return and the self-overcoming of
the overman. 1 If Nietzsche's remarks about "woman" must be
taken together and read within the larger context of his
complete writings and interpreted according to his major
themes, then the only way to arrive at any assessment of
what (if anything) the metaphors "truth is a woman" or "life
1 Kaufmann 307-333.
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is a woman"

might mean is to begin with one of these themes

and work through them. One point of entry into Nietzsche's
interpretation is the quotation that begins this chapter,
the opening statement from the Preface to Beyond Good and

.Etil.. Before any meaning can be assigned to "woman" in the
Nietzschean phrase "truth is a woman," the question of truth
must be asked.
The context that immediately presents itself is that
truth is to be reconsidered as something other than what the
dogmatists have believed it to be -- that is, facts and
concepts that correspond to and represent the world as
provided by reason through the use of logic. Why "woman?" In
Nietzsche's texts woman is characterized by appearance:
But she does not want truth: what is truth to
woman? From the beginning, nothing has been
more alien, repugnant,_ and hostile to woman
than truth -- her great art is the lie, her
highest concern is mere appearance and
beauty. Let us men confess it: we honor and
love precisely this art and this instinct in
woman -- we who have a hard time and for our
relief like to associate with beings under
whose hands, eyes, and tender follies our
seriousness, our gravity and pr9fundity
almost appear to us like folly.
Woman is truth, but truth that is paradoxically a
"lie," not truth that is "true" and therefore hostile.
Nietzsche speaks of lying in his essay On Truth and Lying in
an Extra Moral Sense, saying that "truths are illusions

2 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans.
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage books, 1966) § 232.
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about which it has been forgotten that they are illusions,"
a metaphorical process that begins with perception itself . 3
In this process, a nerve stimulus is translated into an
image which is in turn translated into a sound and words,
which in turn become concepts. In each step a carrying over
occurs between different bodily spheres where no literal
translation is possible -- we lack an "organ" for truth. 4
Further, each perceptual metaphor is unique, yet the
perceptual process involves ordering our perceptions
according to similarity and sameness. It treats different
things as the same, in other words, metaphorically. 5
Concepts point out only the relation of things to man, not
the things themselves. There is no ground or permanent
domain of literal meaning that serves as a reference for the
metaphorical. What is called literal are those metaphors
that have become dead, whose metaphorical meaning has been
forgotten or worn away. 6
Nietzsche is saying that we need to recognize what we
are doing. We must adopt a good will towards appearance (it

3 Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lying in an Extra
Moral Sense trans. in Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and
Language, Gilman, Blair, Parent, eds. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989) 250.
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science §354.
5 Lawrence Hinman, "Nietzsche, Metaphor and Truth,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (1982): 185.
6 Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lying" 250.
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is precisely this we love in woman). Dogmatic philosophers
mistakenly deny our senses and idealize reason, positing a
"real" world behind or beyond them that is accessible
through reason. Nietzsche is rejecting both the idea of a
transcendental world by reference to which this world is
illusory and the idea that the world is immediately present
to us. Thus the world is illusory -- a hyperbolic way of
saying that all our truths are mediated. They allow us to
function and make calculations but we can not claim they are
true of any "real" world in itself.

The apparent world is

not opposed to the true world -- it is the world as it
appears.
Ultimately all relations of truth and language become
functions of metaphor and thus of art. The human is an
artist for whom metaphor is the fundamental vehicle of
thought. Life becomes an aesthetic phenomenon (and we love
precisely this art and this instinct in woman) and as an
aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us." 7
It must be emphasized that Nietzsche is not denying that
truth is possible but saying that it is a heuristic device
that has no claims to describing the way things are in
themselves, only as they are for us. Truth is language -- we
think only in the form of language 8 -- and language is the

7 Nietzsche, Gay Science §107.
8 Nietzsche, The Will to Power §522.
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lie that protects humanity from the hostile chaos of the
universe (her great art is the lie -- woman is so
artistic). 9 Language is the mediating function

between us

and the worldlO -- and if we abolish the "true" world then
we abolish the "apparent" world as well. There is only the
world, the whole, chaotic becoming, as we see it
perspectively. 11 There is no absolute truth.
In attempting to use metaphors in a way that shows the
functioning of metaphors through a series of paradoxical
substitutions, Nietzsche has the "impossible task of
defining in unambiguous signs (Truth is ... ) the functioning
of signs. 12 Thus Nietzsche's texts undermine themselves in a
way that shows that all such undermining of foundations is
inevitable. Critic J. Hillis Miller says of Nietzsche's
essay on truth and lying that

9 Nietzsche, Gay Science §361.
lO Alan D. Schrift, "Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric:
Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Epistemology" Journal of the
History of Philosophy 23 (1985): 373.
11 Nietzsche, Gay Science §109.
12 J.Hillis Miller, "Dismembering and Disremembering in
Nietzsche's 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense'" in Hb.y
Nietzsche Now?, ed. Daniel O'Hara (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1985) 47.
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[the] human world, for Nietzsche as for
Freud, in their different ways, is a
labyrinth of figurative displacements around
an unknown center. What Nietzsche names
"metaphor," "illusion," "transposition," or
"dissimulation" is originally a catachresis.
It replaces the unknown X with a sign which
is neither literal nor figurative. In this it
undermines the distinction between the truth
of literal language and the lie of figurative
language which is the foundation of
N~etzsche'i construction of the labyrinth of
his essay. 3
Once the opposition between the "real" and "apparent"
worlds is done away with in favor of the world that simply
appears, and in which appearances are never replaced with
the "real" but only with new appearances, or new
perspectives, the way is cleared for creative
interpretation 14 There is no "natural" world as in "the
nature of things," only interpretations as human
creations. 15 The world is a work of art

that gives birth

to itself. 16 With interpretation and multiplicity the
individual is free to play, to "overcome the spirit of
gravity" and seriousness (women can make seriousness and
gravity "appear like folly"). What is valued is not the
uncovering of a reality but the interpretation itself.

13 Miller, "Dismembering ... " 45.
14 Alphonso Lingis, "The Will to Power," in The New
Nietzsche, ed. David B. Allison (New York: Dell Publishing
Company, 1977) 43.
15 Allan Megill 30-32.
16 Nietzsche, Will to Power §796.
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The relationship between art and truth is a fundamental
aspect of Nietzsche's thought, where art is both the form
and the means for illusion as our only way of apprehending
the world -- art is that "good will towards appearance. 1117
Paradoxically, only art is true because it treats appearance
as appearance. In questions of art, truth, and appearance in
Nietzsche's texts, "woman" is a primary metaphor. "Woman" is
thus also

fundamental to Nietzsche's texts, where she

appears in many guises, one

more of which is the Vita

Femina:
But perhaps this is the most powerful magic
of life: it is covered by a veil interwoven
with gold, a veil of beautiful possibilities,
sparkling with promise, resistance,
bashfulness, mockery, ~ity, and seduction.
Yes, life is a woman. 1
The vita femina becomes a "central image of Nietzsche's
metaphorical thought about meta-phor. 1119

She is appearance

as art, the veil thrown over existence that makes it
bearable. Life is change and chaos, where every "being" is a
plurality of forces and multiple meanings that is both
affected and effects within a field of forces in which power
is the differential element. 20

What is, is the whole: a

17 Nietzsche, Gay Science §107.
18 Nietzsche, Gay Science §339.
19 Eric Blonde!, "Nietzsche: Life as Metaphor" in
Nietzsche 151.
20 Lingis, "The Will to Power" 51.

~
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world of effects that are reinterpreted, and this
interpretation/reinterpretation is the will to power. Again,
"woman" as a metaphor for life leads us back to Nietzsche's
important themes.
The world as will to power 21 is becoming, difference,
plurality -- not being, identity, unity. It is not the
Hegelian assimilation of what is other but an affirmation of
difference -- the pathos of distance. 22

Knowing is no

longer finding but creating. As such it is the ability to
command a perspective of something -- without forgetting
that it is a perspective.

Although Nietzsche accords to the

desire to fix and order things a necessity for life, he also
attributes it to the common or the herd mentality

and

rejects it in favor of the individual, the unique, the
ability to live without fixed values.
Throughout Nietzsche's texts life and the individual's
relation to life are written about in sexual terms:
creation, birth, potency, fertility, violation, love,
penetration, castration, marriage, seduction, temptation,
21 "Will to power" is a difficult term because
Nietzsche does not believe that there is any single "will"
or any "who wills?" Neither is power simply identified with
crude force. As Nietzsche says, it is not "I will" but "it
wills" -- the idea of ego, the subject, or substance is
already an interpretation that is the result of a struggle
of forces, an interpretation already made that we only react
to. The will to power is best characterized as
interpretation -- the legislation of a point of view.
22 Lingis, "The Will to Power" 41.
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death, violence, destruction, voyeurism, sterility ... The
metaphor "woman" and her relation to "man" is so central
that Nietzsche does not write about truth, life, knowledge,
spirit, art, wisdom, or the will to power, eternal return,
and the overman without using these terms. Nietzsche uses
male/female sexual imagery to say metaphorically what cannot
be said otherwise. Sexuality becomes one mask of the
metaphor for the relation between art and truth that is life
itself.
In this relationship the artist as the warrior against
the ascetic ideal is ambiguously potent/fertile,
male/female, giving/taking, hard/tender, and active/reactive
but never in the sense that these are opposites. 23 Wisdom
is a woman who wants only such warriors, those who can laugh
and kill the spirit of gravity. This spirit belongs to the
ascetic interpretation of life as a burden and suffering for
which someone must be blamed. According to Nietzsche,
ultimately the sufferers are led to blame themselves and
burdened with guilt and sin, redeemed only in another world
"beyond" this one. The ascetic view is itself an affirmation
of life in that it offers an interpretation of suffering
that both explains and justifies it, yet in claiming to be
23 And in implicating "woman" in the discourse about
truth and logic Nietzsche is already suggesting
(posthumously?) the deconstruction of phallogocentrism that
is made within contemporary literary/philosophical
criticism, most notably by Jacques Derrida (See Chapter
I I I).
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true for all, disguises its nature as interpretation and
presents itself as unconditional truth. Thus Nietzsche views
the ascetic as encompassing not only Christianity, but
metaphysics and science, all of which posit some other world
that redeems appearance. In the case of science this is a
set of "natural" laws and explanation

that cease to be

heuristic devices and are claimed true of the "real" world
on the basis of a set of unquestioned propositions or first
principles.
Culture and life as metaphor and metaphorical are a
displacement, a separation of thought from the body, which
is displaced through language, as "surface" phenomena. 24 The
body is unknown and speaks only through signs

man's

"nature" is already second nature, the result of a primeval
and unconscious struggle of impulses of which we only
experience the result. Life as such is a sickness in the
form of bad consciousness, or the repression of our
instincts, a repression that nevertheless is necessary for

24 Giles Deleuze, "Active and Reactive" in .Nfil'.l
Nietzsche 80; Eric Blonde!, "Nietzsche's Style of
Affirmation: The Metaphors of Genealogy" in Nietzsche as
Affirmative Thinker, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel
(Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1986) 135.
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our survival. 25 Yet, for Nietzsche, this sickness is a
"sickness like pregnancy," both sick and productive at the
same time, and "man" was the result. 26 "Woman" thus gives
birth to humanity and culture. "Woman" gives birth to
sublimation and over-coming. 27 As Zarathustra says,
Everything about woman is a riddle, and
everything about woman has one solution: that
is pregnancy. Man is for woman a means: the
end is a~~ays the child. But what is woman
for man?
25 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (with~
li.Qm.Q) trans. Walter Kaufmann (Canada: Random House, 1969)
Section II, §16: "All instincts that do not discharge
themselves outwardly turn inward -- this is what I call the
internalization of man ... But thus began the gravest and
uncanniest illness, from which humanity has not yet
recovered, man's suffering of man, of himself -- the result
of a forcible sundering from his animal past . . . . Let us add
at once that, on the other hand, the existence on earth of
an animal soul turned against itself, taking sides against
itself, was something so new, profound, unheard of,
enigmatic, contradictory, and pregnant with a future that
the aspect of the earth was essentially altered."
26 Blonde!, "Nietzsche: Life as Metaphor" 153.
27 Eric Blonde!, to whose reading of the vita femina I
owe part of my own interpretation, interprets Nietzsche's
vita femina alongside Freud's notion of primal repression as
the origin of consciousness. Thus Blonde! looks for the
"father" if woman is the "mother" of culture. He locates the
dead father in the repressed body (154), and says, "The
culture she gives birth to begins with the initial lie,
which is the repression of the body, the dissimulation of
the father" (156). Blonde! brings in the figure of Oedipus
-- one must forget the murder of the father or face madness,
tragedy, and death (163). Yet against this one must recall
Nietzsche's redefinition of Oedipus as the hero who decides
to live with what he knows. Tracy Strong in "Oedipus as
Hero: Family and Family Metaphors in Nietzsche" in Hh.Y
Nietzsche Now? argues for a Nietzsche that thus redefines
Oedipus (318). Nietzsche himself is not interested in the
father, but in "male mothers."
28 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 66.
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As the metaphor of metaphor woman is ambiguous and
wears multiple masks. She can be misread, as the
metaphysical idealists do when they congeal the vita femina
into an ideal, that of the Eternal Feminine, which is based
on a principle of identity that turns active creativity into
voyeurism and necrophilia. 29

What is fixed is hostile to

life, as metaphysical truth is hostile to woman. "Woman" is
displacement itself, which can be figured but not
represented.
Life as "woman" is also life as will to power, and thus
not passive. It is both force, commanding, and overcoming,
as well as what must be commanded. Woman as nature is woman
as nature's power and the joy in artistic semblance which
transforms the insight into the horror of existence into a
knowledge that both obscures and reveals this existence. In
Nietzsche's characterization, life is Dionysian. Woman here
is associated with the female maenad, a creative and
destructive priestess of Dionysus who "tears to pieces when
she loves" and inspires fear and reverence in the face of
the chaos of existence. 30 The Dionysian is the affirmation
of totality -- the "tragic man affirms even the harshest
suffering. 1131 Dionysus is "he who no longer denies," who can
29 Blonde!, "Nietzsche: Life as Metaphor'' 161.
3 o Nietzsche, Ecce Homo §5; Nietzsche, Beyond Good and
.EJli.l §239.
31 Nietzsche, Will to Power

§1052.
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affirm suffering and "redeem" existence. 32 Life is
collective continuation through procreation and sexuality
change as continual creation. 33
Nietzsche's early work The Birth of Tragedy begins his
analysis of the Dionysian in terms of its role in early
Greek culture and the archetypal forces embodied in the
Greek deities Dionysus and Apollo. Apollo signifies the
imposition of form through the plastic and poetic arts on
the formless flux of becoming that is signified by Dionysus.
Greek Tragedy, which was connected with the Dionysian
religion, was able to affirm form (as a temporary ordering
of chaos) and create meaning while recognizing the
destructive power of life. However, the advent of Platonic
rationality ruptured the unity of the Apollonian and the
Dionysian and gave precedence to the principle of form. For
Nietzsche, this elevation of being as unchanging form which
became the criterion of truth was a falsification of the
appropriate emergence of form as a process of creation out
of formlessness in the aesthetic mode of creativity -- form
which admits its deceptive character. 34 Thus began Western
culture and the alienation of man from his instincts and
32 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols ( with The Antichrist), trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin, 1968)
110 and 54.
33 Nietzsche, Will to Power §1049.
34 Lawrence Hatab, "Nietzsche on Woman," Southern
Journal of Philosophy 19 (1981): 337
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from life as change and creativity. Here we can see the
context for Nietzsche's critique of "Truth."
Further, in pre-Socratic Greek culture, Dionysian
mythology expressed the cyclic regeneration of nature, the
idea that the whole is indestructible. The Dionysian was a
cult of women, worshippers of a god that was frequently
characterized as androgynous and associated with preHellenic mother goddesses. Nietzsche adopted his use of the
terms Apollonian and Dionysian from J.J. Bachofen's work on
myth and mother right, in which Dionysus has the ambiguous
nature of a phallic god that served to intensify feminine
power. The Dionysian, for Bachofen, represents a stage in
the rise of the Apollonian patriarchal principle that was
still tied to the feminine association with the earth and
sensuality

"The phallic god cannot be thought of

separately from feminine materiality." 35 For Bachofen, as
for Nietzsche, the Apollonianism that characterized later
Hellenic society represented the "triumph" of motherless
paternity and immutable form. However, where Bachofen
regarded this as progress in the social order, Nietzsche
clearly did not. According to Lawrence Hatab:

3 5 J.J. Bachofen, Myth. Religion. and Mother Right,
trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1967).
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In general, one could accurately summarize
the cross-cultural features of the masculinefeminine duality as follows: the masculine =
light, knowledge, construction,
consciousness, form;

the feminine = darkness,

mystery, destruction, unconsciousness,
formlessness. So in this sense the Dionysian
cu~t :epre~~nted the worship of the feminine
pr1nc1ple.
Hatab has suggested that "woman" perhaps represents for
Nietzsche "a specific battle in which he fights for the
preservation of the Dionysian." 37 It also indicates the
ancient basis for Western stereotypes, within which
Nietzsche is valorizing "woman" in an attempt to revalue the
values of Western culture, albeit in terms that 20th century
women might reject.
This ecstatic affirmation of life as appearance
requires strength and struggle. It is this attitude toward
life that is figured in the famous remark about the whip in
Zarathustra in the section "On Little Old and Young Women."
Here Zarathustra speaks of women to an old woman he has met,
who then in turn tells him a ''little truth" about women
"You are going to women? Do not forget the whip!" 38
Zarathustra does not forget. Speaking to Life in "The Other
Dancing Song" he says "Keeping time with my whip, you shall
36 Hatab 338.
37 Hatab 337. Hatab even suggests that "the 'place' of
the feminine, for Nietzsche, reflects a Dionysian
superiority [and] ironically ... it would not be difficult
to interpret Nietzsche's philosophy literally as a
'feminism'!"(339).
38 Nietzsche, Zarathustra 67.
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dance and cry! Or have I forgotten the whip? Not I!" 39 The
context for both remarks is Nietzsche's insistence that life
requires a struggle -- and it is not clear to whom the whip
belongs. Elsewhere in Zarathustra Nietzsche refers to the
"evil tamers of beasts," a reference to those dogmatists and
practitioners of the ascetic ideal who force life and truth
into false, frozen forms as the lion tamer uses a whip on
circus lions. 40
Nietzsche frequently uses situations, plot fragments,
phrases, or characterizations that cue references to other
texts. In the section "On Little Old and Young Women" we are
cued to pull Plato into our reading when the old woman asks
Zarathustra what he has hidden under his cloak -- a
reference to the Phaedrus

and the written scroll that

Phaedrus has hidden under his cloak. With Plato in mind we
have no trouble seeing in the figure of the old woman the
Diotima of Plato's Symposium, who is the woman who spoke to
Socrate's soul and gave him his teachings about love,

just

as Zarathustra's old woman gives him his truth about woman.
By subtle allusion, Nietzsche is reminding us of his
revaluation of Platonic thought by "removing" the Socratic
interpretation of Diotima's philosophy, in which human love
for another is the first step up the ladder towards the

3 9 Nietzsche, Zarathustra 226.
4 o Nietzsche, Zarathustra 195.
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contemplation of perfect form, and restoring -- in the
compressed metaphor of the whip -- the pre-Socratic view of
life as becoming and struggle for power. Bachofen describes
Diotima as a figure of pre-Hellenic mystery mother
religion. 41 By alluding to her Nietzsche can refer again to
life as feminine procreation.
While Diotima is only an allusion, one female figure in
Nietzsche's writing bears a name: the mythological figure of
Ariadne. She is important to Nietzsche's telling of the
Eternal Return and its relation to the Dionysian. Nietzsche
believed that myth was a central element of culture, one
reduced to mere fiction by the time of the 19th century. 42
Myth depends on instinct and acceptance, and is dissolved by
rationality and science. The Eternal-Return in Nietzsche's
work has elements of a new myth, one that can give life
meaning in the face of the loss of the old myths and modern
humanity's homelessness. Myth provides for Nietzsche a
system of unconscious, non-conceptual knowledge that can
unite the participants of a particular culture. 43 As the

41 Bachofen 90. Andrea Nye, in her essay "The Hidden
Host: Irigary and Diotima at Plato's Symposium," makes a
very Nietzschean argument: "Understood in historical
context, Diotima is not an anomaly in Platonic discourse,
but the hidden host of Plato's banquet, speaking for a preSocratic world view against which classical Greek thought is
asserted" (Hypatia 3 (Winter, 1989): 45).
42 Megill 72.
43 Megill 82.
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thinker of the Eternal-Return, Nietzsche is creating new
values, not only criticizing old ones. For Nietzsche, myth
is, as faith is for Pascal, an illusion to which we choose
to submit, and thus becomes not only the subject but the
very form art takes.
The Eternal-Return as myth becomes a story that can
transfigure the thinker. 44 The world is such that if
anything ever recurred again, everything else would have to
recur again. 45 All the accidents and fortuitous connections
that combine to create a single individual are crucial. Thus
the highest form of the affirmation of one's life and self
is not merely the acceptance of life -- as change,
appearance, will to power -- but the willingness to accept
the exact same life over and over again. Everything is
connected. As Nietzsche says, this affirmation is such
that one wants nothing to be different, not
forward, not backward, not in all eternity.
Not merely bear what is necessary, still less
conceal it -- all idealism is mendaciousness
~n ~ge face of what is necessary -- but love
it.

4 4 Lingis, "The Will to Power" 59.
45 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) 6.
46 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 258. This becomes a powerful
psychological tool in providing meaning to life in the
absence of meaning.

28
Life in itself is meaningless. It has only the value an
individual or a society can give it. 47 To accept the present
is to accept everything that has happened in creating it.
One must reinterpret the past according to future goals in
such a way that nothing is cause for the resentment or
rejection that comes from brooding about what is past. In
part this goal is the creation of a self. Nietzsche denies
the unity of the self in its givenness, claiming that it is
an abstraction based on reduction -- a surface phenomenon
and interpretation.
This affirmation is intricately bound up with
Ariadne/Dionysus, especially in Nietzsche's later works.
Nietzsche's remark "Who apart from me knows what Ariadne
is!" has puzzled and intrigued many interpreters. 48
Historically, Ariadne is associated with Dionysus, Theseus,
and the Labyrinth of Greek mythology. In most versions of
the myth, Ariadne leads Theseus out of the labyrinth by a
thread, after which he abandons her and she marries Dionysus
and/or dies. 49 In Nietzsche's version of the myth (found not
only in published works but in his Nachlass), Ariadne
47 Nehamas 135.
48 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 308. Ariadne is a "what," not a
"who." Many of Nietzsche's readers look for Ariadne in
figures from Nietzsche's biography such as Cosima Wagner
(most notably Walter Kaufmann), ignoring the place of
Ariadne within Nietzsche's writing.
49 Edith Hamilton, Mythology (Boston: Little, Brown,
and Company, 1942) 67; Hamilton 215-216.
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rejects Theseus, who represents pity, and chooses the
labyrinth as active nihilism or "one's fate in the spirit of
amor fati" -- Nietzsche's affirmation of the EternalReturn. 50 Ariadne can be seen as human suffering transformed
by the Dionysian experience.
As tragic sufferer, Ariadne takes on many of the
aspects previously assigned to Zarathustra. In "The Lament
of Ariadne" in Nietzsche's Dionysos Dithyrambs she is
referred to as "the loneliest one," as was Zarathustra in
his confrontation with the dwarf at the gateway Augenblick
that is a reference to the Eternal-Return. 51

She must

overcome her pity for humanity, and chose the affirmation of
life in death and suffering, tasks that are also
Zarathustra's. The section of Zarathustra called "On the
Great Longing" was originally titled "Ariadne" in
Nietzsche's notes, a section addressed to Zarathustra's soul
-- a reference which survives in numerous allusions to the
secret of the soul, labyrinths, riddles, and threads. 52
Ariadne is the transvaluation of all values in the dithyramb
and is perhaps Dionysus' first disciple (a discipleship
Nietzsche also attributes to himself). Dionysus becomes the

SO Adrian Del Caro, "Symbolizing Philosophy: Ariadne
and the Labyrinth,'' Nietzsche-Studien 17 (1988): 140.
51 Reference to Ariadne: Del Caro 155; Reference to
Zarathustra: Nietzsche, Zarathustra 156.
52 Del Caro 137.
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"Tempter god" who is the catalyst for our need to enter the
labyrinth, there either to overcome or become lost. 53
In an interpretation of "The Lament of Ariadne" Karl
Reinhardt (1935) makes much of this transformation in
gender. Dionysus becomes a new myth that replaces
Zarathustra for a Nietzsche who no longer "keeps at arms
length the possibility of [such] deifications." 54 "The
Sorcerer's Song" in Zarathustra, sung in distress by the
Magician whom Zarathustra beats as an ascetic of the
spirit, 55 becomes "The Lament of Ariadne'' in the Dithyrambs,
which changes the masculine endings to feminine ones and
adds a dramatic epilogue in which Dionysus appears "in
emerald beauty" telling Ariadne "I am your labyrinth." 56
Instead of earning a beating, the one who invokes the god is
heard through a re-interpretation, a change of roles: "A
masculine ending comes to be replaced by a feminine. 1157 Yet
the change is still ambiguous, the dithyramb "labyrinthine."
Nietzsche halts at invoking new gods, earlier in Beyond Good

53 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §370; Beyond Good and
.EYi.l §29 and §295.
54 Karl Reinhardt, "Nietzsche's Lament of Ariadne''
Interpretation 6/3 (October, 1977): 216-217.
55 Nietzsche, Zarathustra 256.
56 Reinhardt 221. Also see David Farrell Krell
Postponements: Women. Sensuality. and Death in Nietzsche
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986) 19.
5 7 Reinhardt 220.
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and Evil even suggesting the possibility that the Eternal
Return might be a "circulus vitiosus deus"

the vicious

circle. 58 He had used Zarathustra's cudgel to strike away
the ascetic of the spirit when he had had enough of his
song. 59 Reinhardt suggests that to unravel this mystery one
must unravel the thread out of the labyrinth that "winds out
into one's own hand." 60 One way to avoid or at least
postpone the construction of new gods while speaking new
truths is to parody constantly the form in which these
truths are represented. This parody is pronounced throughout
Nietzsche's texts in the figure of "woman." 61
Just as

"woman" figures what is highest in Nietzsche's

thought, "woman" also figures what is lowest. In Nietzsche's
writing the reactive woman appears alongside the affirmative
woman -- one must be the master of many perspectives to
58 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §56.
59 Nietzsche, Zarathustra 255-256.

GO Reinhardt 222.
61 David Farrell Krell picks up Reinhardt's suggestion
of the halt Nietzsche makes at this point. His thesis is
that of a tragic Ariadne that Nietzsche postponed -- an
Ariadne that represents the configuration
Woman/Sensuality/Death. The women in Nietzsche's texts
become duplicities (again the vicious circle) that are kept
at a distance. There can be no straightforward revelation of
Dionysos. The Eternal-Return is announced in the figure of
Zarathustra, who "postpones the consequences of his own
teaching, invents a consolation for himself, flirts with
eternity" -- a postponement of the tragedy that is yet "in
pursuit, relentlessly." It is the hand of woman holding the
thread that Nietzsche comes back to, a hand that Nietzsche
himself writes with ... (85-87).
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"know women." Most of Nietzsche's more notorious remarks
about women are to be found among his analysis of the
reactive, negative, life-denying perspective. Nietzsche
claims, as a master of perspectives, to be able to reverse
perspective -- to look up from the swamp as well as down
from mountain tops. 62 In Nietzsche's analysis of the
reactive the word female becomes a pejorative term. His
remarks embody his anti-egalitarianism and his views of the
decadence of Western culture (Platonic/Christian/Scientific)
which suppresses nature and the creative instinct in favor
of spirit, mind, and reason, and which levels society, thus
prohibiting the emergence of the exceptional individual in
the figure of the artist-creator that Nietzsche valorizes.
Nietzsche's thought is hierarchical in a non-political and
relative sense. It alternates between different perspectives
that are part of an "order of rank 1163 that consists of
relative gradations between the noble, active, affirmative
master morality and the base, passive, negative slave or
herd morality. The herd is associated by Nietzsche with
social existence, which he saw as the imposition of
uniformity. 64 The herd individual is seen by society only as
a function of the larger group and values him/herself only

62 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 223.
63 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §228.
64 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §354.
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as this function. 65 While this is an affirmation of a life
that is good for some, what Nietzsche is rejecting is not
any particular judgement but the very tendency on the part
of society to make general judgements about the value of
life and impose unconditional codes "as if there were such a
single theory with a character of its own, capable of being
praised or blamed by some uniform standard. 1166 For
Nietzsche, it is impossible to prescribe what anyone should
be -- the individual must create his own life. Like the
ascetic, the herd is motivated by revenge or envy of those
who can maintain their distance from the crowd.
The careful reader understands that these are not
differences of class but differences between individuals in
terms of their attitudes towards life. According to
Niet~sche,

one's attitude toward life is valued positively

if it is an affirmation of life that acts out of abundance
and love and negatively if it is a denial of life that
results from hunger and dissatisfaction. This goes beyond
the distinction between those who idealize life as being or
those who can accept change, destruction, and becoming.
Thus, the will to life as becoming can be that of Dionysian
affirmation or a nihilistic hatred that wants to destroy.
The will to immortalize similarly can come from artistic

65 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §116.
66 Nehamas 135.
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love or from a tyrannical, reactive will that turns
idiosyncrasy into binding law. 67 For Nietzsche the
affirmative/reactive is the important distinction and he
valorizes the creator who acts out of a sense of the
fullness and value of his/her own life without attempting to
create values for all and who is opposed to a herd mentality
that acts out of revenge and imposes its standards on
everyone. 68

The creator, as I indicated above (page 11)

embodies both male and female characteristics. What is noble
is a matter of self-overcoming: the ability to say "This is
my good and my evil." 6 9

Reactive "woman" takes two forms: "woman" as ideal and
"woman" who plays with truth "as if it were a fetish," using
it to her own advantage. "Woman" in the first sense is the
Eternal Feminine -- woman as hypostatized ideal (woman as
such, truth as such) or woman who herself identifies with

67 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §370.
68 Hatab 341.
69 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §257.
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such ideals. 70 Nietzsche says, "Woman wants to become selfreliant -- and for that reason she is beginning to enlighten
men about 'woman as such':

this is one of the worst

developments of the general uglification

of Europe ... " and

"even now truth finds it necessary to stifle her yawns when
she is expected to give answers. In the end she is a woman:
she should not be violated. 1171

"Woman" in the second sense

collaborates with the idealism of men:
Woman, conscious of man's feelings concerning
women, assists his efforts at idealization by
adorning herself, walking beautifully,
dancing, expressing delicate thoughts; in the
same way, she practises modesty, reserve,
distance -- realizing instinctively that in
this way t92 idealizing capacity of the man
will grow.
Seduction is here applied as a reactionary force, as
deception with a bad conscience.
The passages on women and feminism in Beyond Good and
~

(§232-239) are the last part of a larger section titled

"Our Virtues." The major themes of this section set the
70 Nietzsche is using Goethe's Eternal Feminine from
the last lines of Faust in order to parody its idealism.
That his translator Hollingdale seems not to have noticed
this, and remarks "das Ewig-Weibliche, Goethe's coinage in
the last lines of Faust ("The eternal-feminine draws us
aloft") is often the object of Nietzsche's mockery,
apparently because he cannot see any meaning in it," is poor
reading (Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols 69n). Nietzsche
says of the Eternal Feminine " -- I do not doubt that every
nobler woman will resist this faith" (Beyond Good and Evil
§236).
71 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §232 and §220.
72 Nietzsche, Will to Power §806.
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context for reading the passages on "woman." Nietzsche here
addresses the "first born of the twentieth century" and
stresses both the need to maintain an order of rank and the
necessity of suffering as the molding force of the
exceptional individual. In his defense of anti-conventional
morality Nietzsche defends the exception against its
opposition from the mediocre bourgeois norm -- from the
revenge of the limited and their pity:
... it is immoral to say: "i;gat is right for
one is fair for the other."
... the general welfare is no ideal, no goal,
no remotely intelligible concept, but only an
emetic -- that what is fair for one cannot by
any mea~~ for that reason alone be fair for
others.
Nietzsche's arguments against equality and feminism have to
be read from the perspective of his insistence that the
concept equality had so far served to level society and make
it average and his insistence that no new reactionary ideals
or binding conceptions of how individuals must function be
established -- his call for the individual willing to
experiment and create new values for his/herself.
It is in this sense that Nietzsche calls feminism a
backwardness, and a "weakening and dulling of the most
feminine instincts." 75 Here feminism appears as a

73 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §221.
74 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §228.
75 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §239.
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continuation of decadent Western (and predominantly
masculine) culture by attempting to speak for "woman as
such." Feminism is equated in this sense with idealization.
Thus, Nietzsche, here and elsewhere, makes his remarks about
feminists as abortive females, or remarks, in reference to
"woman as clerk," that "woman is retrogressing." 76 Thus also
Nietzsche writes:
"Emancipation of women" -- that is the
instinctive hatred of the abortive woman, who
is incapable of giving birth, against the
woman who is turned out well -- the fight
against the "man" is always a mere means,
pretext, tactic. By raising themselves
higher, as "woman in herself," as the "higher
woman," as a female "idealist," they want to
lower the general rank of woman; and there is
no surer means for that than higher
education, slacks, and political votingcattle rights. At bottom, the emancipated are
the anarchists in the world of the 'eternally
feminine,' the underprivileged w99se most
fundamental instinct is revenge.
Given Nietzsche's own basis for assigning a positive or
negative value to a perspective, "the emancipated woman" is
here condemned by Nietzsche not because she adopts the goals
of equality per se, but because she adopts these values from
within a herd morality, motivated by revenge, and attempts
to legislate for all. Yet it is just this kind of writing
that gives the reader pause, even when the context and
function seem under interpretative control. It is not really

76 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
77 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 267.

§239.
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clear whose revenge is speaking. The same hand that writes
that the perfect woman is of a higher, rarer type than the
perfect man also reinscribes Socrates' last words: "O
Criten, do tell someone to take those women away! 1178 As
Derrida claims, "perhaps it simply must be admitted that
Nietzsche himself did not see his way too clearly there:"
He was, he dreaded this castrated woman.
He was, he dreaded this castrating woman.
He was, he loved this affirming woman.
At once, simultaneously or successively,
depending on the position of his body and the
situat~~n of his story, Nietzsche was all of
these.
Nietzsche's "remarks on woman call into question the
ideal or the idol of feminism and anti-feminism -- woman as
such, in herself, engendered in terms of what should be the
case for or the condition of women as human beings." 80 To
Nietzsche, feminism is not progressive but regressive in
that women take their place in masculine society only if
they castrate themselves. This resonates with a contemporary
feminist concern that the attempt to gain political,
economical, and social equality by participation in a male

78 Nietzsche, Human All Too Human, trans. Hollingdale
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) §337; Human
All Too Human §437.
79 Jacques Derrida, Spurs, trans. Barbara Harlow
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979) 101.
SO Gayle Ormiston, "Traces of Derrida: Nietzsche's
Image of Woman" Philosophy Today 28 (Summer 1984): 180.
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society must avoid relapsing into patriarchal practices and
values.
In a related context I would include Nietzsche's remark
on the scholarly woman:
When a woman has scholarly inclinations there
is usually something wrong with her sexually.
Sterility itself disposes one towards a
masculinity of taste; for man is, if I may
say so, "the sterile animal." 8
It is the association of sterility and masculinity that is
striking. Statements like this and the one above were
written both to provoke and to eliminate the reader who
could not or would not be drawn in by them to struggle with
Nietzsche's texts. Here it is necessary also to bring in
Nietzsche's critique of the "scholarly type," in which the
Scholar (male) is depicted as an old maid who can neither
beget nor give birth and whose wisdom has the odor of the
swamps. 82 The modern objective spirit may deserve care and
honor, but can be no goal and thus it is also "nothing for
women" -- science in the form of disinterested objectivity
offends the modesty of all real women, who "know" that
everything is a matter of interest. 83 Once again women are
criticized when they adopt the decadent Western values that
Nietzsche rejects.

8l Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §144.
82 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §206; Zarathustra
125.
83 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §207 and §127.

40
Setting Nietzsche's remarks on

"woman" in context and

explicating their function is not the end of any
interpretation of "woman" in his text. As Allison Ainley has
written, the feminist reader
who wishes to question the singular, unified
self implicated with patriarchal systems
cannot accept a purely mimetic view of
language and consequently requires a more
complex understanding ~f "woman" in
Nietzsche's writings. 8
The reason one would want to question the rational concept
of the self along with Nietzsche is that gender
constructions are interrelated with our ontological,
epistemological constructions of a rational, autonomous self
-- to undermine the former requires the more general
subversion of the latter. In other words, women are
determined not only by their social and political status but
also by the logical processes through which meaning is
created. 85

Rationality, male power, and language as

"phallocratic" discourse are the objects of deconstruction
"because of [their] coextensivity with the history of
Western metaphysics, a history inseparable from political
economy and from the property of man as holder of

84 Alison Ainley "Ideal Selfishness: Nietzsche's
Metaphor of Maternity" in Exceedingly Nietzsche, ed. David
Farrell Krell and David Wood (New York: Routledge, 1988)
118.
SS Alice Jardine, Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and
Modernity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985) 44.
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property." 86 In this context, how do Nietzsche's feminine
metaphors fare? Are they a reduction of women to woman and
to seduction, a typical male appropriation characterized by
the observation that "where woman and her domains are
employed as a metaphor for some other human enterprise, the
latter is viewed as belonging exclusively to man?" 87 Is
Nietzsche a male philosopher dressing up like a woman? 88
While Nietzsche's "woman" is stereotypical in some of
her attributes, his use of "woman" exceeds familiar
stereotypes. "Woman" as Nietzsche's lever to deconstruct
rationalism disrupts not only rationality but gender
differences and hierarchies. Nietzsche does not reduce
"woman" to any particular image or totality, but affirms
multiple possibilities. 89 If "progress in the life of reason

86 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Displacement and the
Discourse of Woman" in Displacement: Derrida and After, ed.
Mark Krupnick (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983)
185.
87 Eva Feder Kittay, "Woman as Metaphor" Hypatia 3/2
(Summer, 1988): 79.
88 Kelly Oliver, "Nietzsche's Woman" Radical Philosophy
48 (1988): 25.
89 Gender here refers to masculine/feminine, not
male/female. Where masculine and feminine are cultural masks
that can change, the biological sexes remain, in fact
Nietzsche insists on the "war of the sexes" as the necessary
tension that generates the creative individual (Hatab 341).
Nietzsche writes in the Gay Science "if both partners felt
impelled by love to renounce themselves, we should then get
-- I do not know what; perhaps an empty space?" (319).
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is a struggle to transcend the feminine" 90 where the female
is not even a self but only the object of knowledge (active
male reason/mind/science applied to passive female
sensation/matter/nature), then in deconstructing truth
Nietzsche deconstructed the female object of knowledge as
well. He both reverses the ancient Western sexual
hierarchies
Active/Passive
Reason/Intuition
Head/Heart
Father/Mother
Form/Matter
Logos/Pathos
Culture/Nature
Intelligible/Sensible
Truth/Fals~ly

Self/Other
in which the first element of each pair is both masculine
and superior -- the male half an "idealized" version of the
female -- and valorizes the second feminine member. Beyond
reversing the hierarchical pairs, however, Nietzsche
undercuts the differences between them. The pairs are no
longer opposites but interrelated, the sexual differences
blurred, the sex they "belong" to questionable and engaged
in a perspectival tension that flip-flops eternally.
Nietzsche uses parody, style, and paradox to question all

90 Genevieve Lloyd, "Texts, Metaphors and the
Pretensions of Philosophy," Philosophy and Literary Theory
69 (1986): 98.
9 1 Helene Cixous, ''Sorties" in New French Feminisms,
ed. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (New York:
Schocken Books, 1981) 90.
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"ideals" -- woman amuses herself in his texts beyond the
grasp of norms and normalizing. His work tries to show that
there are no universal hierarchies we must accept, only the
imposition of a certain way of speaking, of a certain way of
life.
Given the paradoxical, ironical aspects of Nietzsche's
writing, it is still possible to do what many traditional
philosophers have done and accord to the signature
"Nietzsche" a system based on what Nietzsche believed about
life, culture, knowledge, and truth (and those who do so
usually leave "woman" out of their account). And yet, a
careful reading of his texts also cannot avoid the
possibility that Nietzsche's own metaphorical style(s) and
irony suggest, that Truth inevitably sets itself up as an
ideal, that in language what one wants to say is always
subverted, that "we will always have a God [here understood
in a more than religious sense] as long as we believe in
grammar." Because a metaphor cannot be translated without
remainder or without loss, the concept "metaphor" (one must
see the paradox here) at least remains and is itself
dependent

upon a system of truth for its meaning. 92 The

possibility exists that Nietzsche's ultimate affirmation of
the Eternal Return is vicious circle and that Nietzsche's

92 Derrida, ''White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of
Philosophy " in Margins, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982) 219.
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views are a consolation that justifies a particular life
Nietzsche's. Nietzsche himself claims that his views are his
own and that there is no one way. He wanted no disciples,
only readers who could use what he said to create their own
way.
The use of the metaphor "woman" as a central vehicle
that bears Nietzsche's truths displaces all normative truth.
"Woman" as a metaphor for metaphor is the subversive body in
Nietzsche's texts. It is this very subversion that has
become so important to the contemporary discourse of
deconstruction and interpretation. But for the danger of
presuming to read intention into any text in the name of
Nietzsche, one would like to say that this is deliberate,
that Nietzsche "knew" what he was doing, that there are
textual clues that enable us to argue for Nietzsche's
control of his text. Nietzsche perhaps intended to command
"woman" as his strategy, practising "the multiplication bf
antagonistic metaphors in order better to control or
neutralize their effects," 93 while in undermining this
control shows us as a way of writing that truth is both
impossible and unavoidable. And one is tempted (Dionysus is
the Tempter God) to see a plan in this, a carefully plotted
labyrinth. Yet it is impossible for the reader to say what
Nietzsche believes about "woman" -- they are his truths.

93 Derrida, "White Mythology" 214.
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Here the reader is forced to realize that her goals
guide her reading. Mine are the affirmation of Nietzsche's
affirmative woman and the reading of "woman" as a strategy
women can use.

It is Nietzsche himself who says if you want

to know what I mean, then find the force that gives a new
sense to what I say, and hang the text upon it. 94 Thus the
feminist reader can laugh at Nietzsche's outrageous remarks
(and in doing so echo Nietzsche's own laughter) and use, not
what he said but how he said it, as the powerful weapon it
is in the deconstruction of the opposition
masculine/feminine -- no longer given but cultural
constructions that permit multiple possibilities and
differences. And, if it is necessary for now to be "men"
because equality, power, and salaries are defined in male
terms, here too Nietzsche provides a precedent. It is
possible to fight for these same things out of a sense of
abundance and affirmation, not imposing uniformity and
reducing differences to similarities but respecting each
individual's right within feminism to find their own way. As
the feminist writer Julia Kristeva has argued, women must
enter the patriarchal world but at the same time constantly
expose that thought. 95 Nietzsche has also written that

94 Giles Deleuze, "Nomad Thought'' in New Nietzsche 145.
95 Andrea Nye, Feminist Theory and the Philosophies of
M..an (London and New York: Croom Helm, 1988) 148.
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the philosophic spirit always had to use as a
mask and cocoon the previously established
types of the contemplative man ... in order
to be able to exist at all; the ascetic ideal
for a long time served the philosopher as a
form in which to appear ... the ascetic priest
provided until the most modern times the
repulsive and gloomy caterpillar form in
which alone ;ge philosopher could live and
creep about.
Could "woman" become in the same way "that many-colored and
dangerous winged creature" that emerges form the caterpillar
"man" 97 using the patriarchal world as temporary shelter?
Fittingly enough, Nietzsche himself precedes the aphorisms
on "woman" in The Gay Science with the aphorism "Only as
creators!" in which are these lines:
What was at first appearance becomes in the
end, almost invariably, the essence and is
effective as such. How foolish it would be to
suppose that one only needs to point out this
origin and this misty shroud of delusion in
order to destroy the world that counts for
real, so-called "reality." We can destroy
only as creators. -- But let us not forget
this either: it is enough to create new names
and estimations and probabilities in §rder to
create in the long run new "things." 9

96 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 115-116.
97 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 116.
98 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §58.

CHAPTER II
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF NIETZSCHE RECEPTION
The interpretation that I have just offered has, as a
type of reading influenced by Derrida, its own historical
context in the reception of Nietzsche. The metaphor "woman''
has had no significance in Nietzsche interpretation until
recently, beginning with the 1970s. Taking seriously what
Nietzsche writes about "woman" and women, instead of
dismissing these remarks as irrelevant rhetorical aspects of
primarily philosophical texts, is relevant to the
development of feminism during this same period. This alone
would not necessarily result in any change in the general
views of Nietzsche as a misogynist, for feminist readers can
(and do) take Nietzsche's remarks literally and treat his
texts as examples of a type of sexism. 1 "Woman" is still not
seen as an integral part of Nietzsche's writing, except in a
negative way. Reading Nietzsche's remarks affirmatively, as
I have done, also requires taking the literariness of his
texts seriously -- a reading that no longer tries to read
1 For example, see Ellen Kennedy, "Nietzsche: Women as
Untermensch" in Women in Western Political Philosophy, ed.
Kennedy, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1987) 179-201; Kelly
Oliver, "Woman as Truth in Nietzsche's Writing," Social
Theory and Practise 10 (1984): 185-200; and Kelly Oliver,
"Nietzsche's Woman: The Poststructuralist Attempt to Do Away
with Women," Radical Philosophy 48 (1988): 25-29.
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Nietzsche according to traditional philosophical
conventions, extracting a series of arguments, but pays
attention to the styles and rhetoric of his texts as
philosophy. This attitude toward interpretation also appears
in the late 60s and 70s -- first in France -- among
philosophers and literary critics who challenged the
traditional divisions of academic disciplines and the

~1

conventions of traditional philosophy, history, and literary
criticism. The works of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault
are important here. Derrida in particular combines a concern
for feminist issues with an attention to Nietzsche's styles
that reveals a different, affirmative "woman."
Derrida and Foucault represent the most influential
contemporary strains of Nietzsche reading, but the character
of their interpretations differs greatly from that given to
his texts by earlier readers. Nietzsche interpretation has
passed through a number of transformations since the first
generation of his readers. The relative importance of a
particular sequence of readers has also changed. Today the
genealogy Nietzsche/Heidegger/Foucault/Derrida is the most
significant and establishes the importance of Heidegger in
Nietzsche interpretation, yet for Heidegger a different
sequence was important, including Ernst Bertram, Ludwig
Klages, and Alfred Baumler. No history of Nietzsche's
readers could hope to be complete as the list would have to
include not only a multitude of philosophers and cultural
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analysts, but all the writers of literature and poetry who
found inspiration in Nietzsche's works. Further, there is
the relationship of Nietzsche to Freud and psychology.
Therefore, in offering a brief history of Nietzsche's
readers with the intention of showing how "woman" has come
to be of significance in Nietzsche interpretation, I must
narrow my focus primarily to his philosophical readers with
emphasis from Heidegger to the present.
Nietzsche's pre-world war I reputation was based
primarily on his fame as a prose stylist, poet, essayist,
and culture critic. 2 His work was important more to young
artists and writers of the period from 1890-1915, who
identified with his cosmopolitanism in their own efforts
against mid-19th Century German parochialism. 3 A few
philosophical interpretations were made, in particular those
by the Danish critic Georg Brandes, one of Nietzsche's first
supporters whose "Aristokratischer Radikalismus" in the late
1880s discussed the themes of Nietzsche's Genealogy of
Morals, and Hans Vaihinger, whose Nietzsche als Philosoph
(1902) interpreted Nietzsche philosophy as an extension of

2 David Farrell Krell, "Analysis" in Nietzsche: The
Will to Power as Art (vol. 1) by Martin Heidegger, trans.
Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1979) 238.
3 J. Hollingdale, Nietzsche (London: ARK, 1985) 196.
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his own "philosophy of as-if (Die Philosophie des Als-Ob)." 4
However, Nietzsche's appeal was more as a exemplary
personality admired by those who wanted something new and
rejected bourgeois German life in seeking a regeneration of
German culture. Nietzsche first became a legendary figure in
the hands of Stefan Georg (1868-1933). 5 Georg played a role
in the late nineteenth century German literary revival and
restoration of German lyric poetry. Against modern mass
society, Georg instituted an elitist cult of the artist. 6
Two of the most important figures in early Nietzsche
literature were disciples of the Georg circle: Ernst Bertram
and Ludwig Klage~.

7

Bertram's very influential Nietzsche:

Versuch einer Mythologie (1918) was concerned with
Nietzsche's individuality, not his philosophy. 8 Bertram, in
a

chapter titled "German Becoming" added Nietzsche to a

lineage that began with Luther, and ran through Novalis,
Holderlin, and Lessing to Nietzsche as unique individuals

4 Georg Brandes, "Aristokratischer Radikalismus" in .2..Q.
Jahre Philosophische Nietzsche Rezeption, ed. Alfredo
Guzzoni (Konigstein/Ts: Hain, 1979) 1-15; Hans Vaihinger,
"Nietzsche's Wille zum Schein" 90 Jahre 25-28.
5 Walter Kaufmann 9.
6 Hajo Holborn 401-404.
7 Kaufmann 12.
8 Kaufmann 12.
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who embodied a German essence. 9 Bertram dominated discussion
of Nietzsche in the 20s and 30s. 10 He portrayed a Nietzsche
that was "the typically ambiguous one," a duality whose
contradictions made any systematic or contextual analysis
unnecessary. 11 In the process of legend-making Bertram
discarded parts of Nietzsche's thought, especially that of
the Eternal Return. Nietzsche's philosophy was buried under
the emphasis on his prophecy and his personal life,
particularly his insanity, a factor that remains even in
later readers like Jaspers (1936) and Bataille (1945). For
the Georg circle Nietzsche was not only a legend but one who
had predicted Germany's conditions after World War I and
stood as its judge, pointing the way to a cultural
revaluation. 12 Along with the Kulturphilosophie, and its
emphasis on Nietzsche as Immoralist, Anti-Christ, and the
Overman, developed the reading of Nietzsche as a philosopher
of Life and the search for new values immanent in life
rather than transcendent. 13 Here, Ludwig Klages ("Die
psychologischen Errungenschaften Friedrich Nietzsches -- Ein
9 Krell, "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 1) 239 and
"Analysis," in Nietzsche: Nihilism (vol. 4) by Martin
Heidegger (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987) 265.
lO Krell, "Analysis," in Nietzsche: Will to Power as
Knowledge and as Metaphysics (vol. 3) by Martin Heidegger
(New York: Harper and Row, 1987) 273.
11 Cited in Kaufmann 74; Kaufmann 13.
12 Krel 1, "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 1) 240.
13 Guzzoni, "Vorwart" in 90 Jahre viii.
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Selbstbericht," 1920) provided a different reading of
Nietzsche as a psychologist and of the Will to Power as the
biological basis of psychological drives. Klages called
Nietzsche the founder of modern psychology. 14 Nietzsche's
psychological achievement is described as delineating the
battle between the ascetic and the Dionysian, although his
Will to Power remains trapped in the ascetic -- "dieses
grosste Fesselnsprenger der Menscheit selber ein Gefesselter
war." 15 Klages valorizes the Dionysian, developing a
philosophy of ''orgiastics" that, according to D.F. Krell,
exalted life with "even wilder abandon than Zarathustra." 16
Alfred Baumler, professor of philosophy in Berlin from
1933-1945 began the metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche
in the 1930s with his Nietzsche. 17 Baumler argued that
Nietzsche's important work was his notes "edited" into

~

Will to Power as his intended magnum opus, not the works
14 Henri F. Ellenberger 272. Klages own psychology had
affinities to Nietzsche, especially in his notion that
consciousness carried out only what the unconscious had
begun -- the building of images. The intellect "turns into
stone" through concepts. Klages "nimmt ... leidenschaftlich
die Partei des bewusstlos-bildenden Lebens, gegen die der
bewussten Wissenschaft, des bewussten Geistes, des Willens
zur Unterwerfung der Natur." (Cited in Heinrich Schmidt,
Philosophisches W6rterbuch (Leipzig: Alfred Kroner Verlag,
1934) 331).
15 Krell, "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 1) 242. Quote
cited in Guzzoni 32.
16 Krell, "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 1) 242
17 Krell, "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 4) 269; Guzzoni
viii.
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published during Nietzsche's lifetime. Baumler rejects the
Eternal Return because it impresses being on becoming and
contradicts the system of the Will to Power -- the Eternal
Return "cancels" eternal becoming. 18 Baumler rejects both
Klages' psycho-biologistic interpretation and Bertram's
mythologizing, presenting Nietzsche as the last great
thinker of the West. 19 He argues for a systematic
interpretation of Nietzsche's work as metaphysics. In the
1930s and 40s Baumler was the authority on Nietzsche, whose
commentary accompanied most of Nietzsche's published works
during this period. As a leading Nietzsche scholar Baumler
did a great deal of damage to Nietzsche's later reputation
by claiming him for the Nazis (Nietzsche und der
Nationalsozialismus, 1934), explaining away Nietzsche's anti
Germanism and assimilating him into the German "spirit,"
presenting Nietzsche and Hitler as "joint" opponents of
democratic-parliamentarian bourgeois society. 20 Both Klages

18 Baumler, "Der Wille als Macht," in 90 Jahre (ed.
Guzzoni) 52: "[der ewigen Wiederkunft] ... das Bild des
ewigens Werdens auf zuheben und ein Bild des ewigen Seins an
die Stelle zu setzen . . . . Indem der Begriff der ewigen
Wiederkunft erscheint, verschwindet der heraklitische
Charakter der Welt."
19 David Farrell Krell, "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 3)
269.

20 David Farrell Krell "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 4)
271.
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and Baumler exalt part of Nietzsche at the expense of the
whole. 21
Jaspers, Heidegger, and Karl Lowith belong to the same
general period as Baumler, and all reject his efforts to
assimilate Nietzsche into National Socialism. 22 For Lowith,
Nietzsche is also a systematic philosopher, the key to whom
is nihilism -- bounded by the death of God and man's
homelessness and the "self-surmounting of nihilism in
eternal return. 1123 Jaspers' and Heidegger's approaches to
Nietzsche are both guided by their own philosophies. Thus
Jaspers' Nietzsche is a precursor to existentialism and
Heidegger's Nietzsche is the last metaphysician whose
philosophy ended metaphysics. 24 Here, Nietzsche is the last
because in interpreting Truth as an error he is still
21 Karl Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche (Garden City:
Anchor Books, 1967) 190: "In his ingenious aversion to will
and spirit, Klages divides Nietzsche and declares him to be
an 'orgiastic' philosopher of the 'body' and the 'soul,'
retaining the Nietzsche of the Dionysian philosophy at the
expense of the Will to Power and to nothingness. In his
desire for battle, Baumler interprets Nietzsche of the Will
to Power and to nothingness as an "heroic realist" and
political philosopher at the expense of the Dionysian
philosophy of Eternal Return."
22 By 1934 Heidegger had resigned his rectorship of the
University of Freiburg and had become increasingly critical
of Nazi ideology (See Krell, "Introduction" to Heidegger's
Basic Writings (New York: Harper and row, 1977) 29).
23 Lowith 192.

24 Kaufmann wryly says of Heidegger that it is "one of
the major efforts -- certainly the bulkiest one -- of the
later Heidegger: important for those who want to understand
Heidegger" (Kaufmann 500).
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identifying truth with the metaphysical project of truth as
correctness, at the same time revealing the emptiness of
that project. Thus for Heidegger as well, Nietzsche opens a
new way -- that of the renewed questioning of the Being of
beings (Heidegger's lectures, although presented during this
period, were not published until 1961). Jaspers'
interpretation extends elements of the Lebensphilosophie
attributed to Nietzsche. Nietzsche "obeys a dialectic
without realizing it" by living through it. He is the
''sacrifice" whose insanity is a symbol for the total risk of
himself in the identification with absolute negativity. 25
Yet, Nietzsche's negation of transcendence brings about its
own reappearance. His thoughts intentionally contradict
themselves in a self-consuming philosophy that cannot be
transmitted, only experienced. Nietzsche's will to say Yes
opens the way for the philosophy of Existenz -- the
authentic knowledge of existence. 26
Heidegger's Nietzsche is very significant to recent
postmodern interpretations of Nietzsche, most of which are
counter interpretations to his. Before considering Heidegger
I want to bring attention to one other interesting aspect of
Nietzsche's early reception in the context of Nietzsche as
culture critic. This is the New Morality movement within
25 Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche (Tucson: The University of
Arizona Press, 1965) 447.
26 Jaspers 443.
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German feminism in turn of the century Germany. For most of
this first generation of readers, Nietzsche's misogyny was
taken for granted -- Nietzsche was the "Frauenfeind." 27
However, within the feminist movement a form of radical
feminism developed that was based on new libertarian ideals
of sexual morality.2 8
Helen Stocker was the primary founder of this movement
and she conceded that Nietzsche was the dominant early
influence on the New Morality (Die neue Ethik) she espoused,
refuting the common belief that Nietzsche was anti-female. 29
She argued that Nietzsche taught women to be spiritually
independent, reject a narrow bourgeois existence, and break
free of existing convention through self-conquest and the
liberation of their individual creative powers. By 1903 she
was against marriage, arguing that "he taught them to reject
the old conventions of sexual morality as well as the old
restrictions of their role in life." 30

27 Ellen Kennedy 181; R. Hinton Thomas, Nietzsche in
German Politics and Society 1890-1918 (La Salle: Open Court,
1983) 83.
28 Richard Evans, The Feminist Movement in Germany
1894-1933 (London and Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications,
1976) 115.
29 Evans 117. That Nietzsche was influential in the New
Morality is apparent not only from the writings of Helen
Stocker, but from her opponents, who blamed Nietzsche as the
''villain" and his revaluation of values as the source of
their excesses (Thomas 84-85).
3 o Evans 119
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This was an extension of feminism into women's personal
lives which called for women to prescribe their own scale of
values and placed more emphasis on the fulfillment of a
woman's nature -- especially her biological nature

than

on social roles or political equality. 31 The New Morality
sponsored homes for unwed mothers, abortion, free love,
contraception, and the idea that marriage was a form of
prostitution. According to Hinton Thomas in his chapter "The
Feminist Movement and Nietzsche," Helen Stocker was "the
most Nietzsche-oriented and most intelligent exponent of
this hoped for ethical revolution." 32 Stocker was a major
mediator for Nietzsche within the feminist movement, but
most knew about him mainly by hearsay as the author of
Zarathustra. 33
In 1904 a Mothers' League (Mutterschutz) was formed
(for unmarried mothers) based on the New Morality, and
Stocker played a prominent role. 34 The New Morality and the
Mothers' League polarized the women's movement and aroused a
great deal of hostility. 35 In 1909 Mutterschutz was rejected

31 Thomas 88; Evans 138.
32 Thomas 87.
33 Thomas 91.
34 Evans 122.
35 Evans 137.
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by the general organization for German women's groups. 36
Temporarily liberalism, Social Darwinism, and Nietzsche were
combined in an ideology that blended the most libertarian
and individualist elements of each. 37
These elements could not remain combined for long. The
social and national aspects of Social Darwinism and
Nietzschean individualism were ultimately inimical to each
other. By 1915 Social Darwinism was the chief force in
Mutterschutz. 38 The emphasis on woman's fulfillment of her
nature as biology developed into a concern for the race, and
Helen Stocker would say that the care for the coming race
was the driving force of Mutterschutz (adding that this was
a different orientation than Nietzsche's). 39
The combination of Nietzsche with Social Darwinism by
the proponents of the New Morality shows an opportunistic
use of Nietzsche's "woman." If they rejected the supposed
misogyny of Nietzsche's texts, they failed to heed his
arguments against essentialism and identity, and thus
assimilated "woman" to a biological conception of her nature
-- one that was coopted by a masculine demographic, even
racist, politics. This early attempt to make use of
36 Thomas 83.
37 Evans 138.
38 Thomas 92.
39 Thomas 92.
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Nietzsche's affirmative "woman" failed because the radical
implications in Nietzsche's texts could not yet be read. The
only mode of interpretation available to them was that of
Nietzsche as culture critic, the champion of "selfhood" 40
who appealed to a generation concerned with Individualitat
and PersOnlichkeit. 41
In Wilhelmine Germany Nietzsche was adopted by those
who resisted conformity, while among nationalists he was
unpopular and associated with moral degeneracy -- although
various "mottos'' were lifted from Nietzsche's texts. 42
Ironically, Nietzsche would later be adopted by a different
set of nationalists -- National Socialists -- who gathered
arguments against ideas of a democratic order and found ways
to press Nietzsche into service with the aid of Nietzsche's
sister and her control of the Nietzsche archives. 43
Nietzsche's Will to Power was afterwards understood in a
political sense. 44 Nietzsche as metaphysician and as
"politiker" appeared together in the readings by Baumler.
The Will to Power came to be associated with political
40 Thomas 80.
41 Thomas 2.
4 2 Thomas 126, 128.
43 Walter Kaufmann, in his chapter titled "The Master
Race" accuses Nazi authors, including Baumler, of
unscrupulousness as Nietzsche-readers, abandoning
scholarship in taking remarks out of context.
4 4 Hollingdale 198.
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power, especially by those not directly familiar with
Nietzsche's writing. It is in this environment that
Heidegger began his lecture course on Nietzsche.
Because Heidegger's lectures were not published until
1961, modern readings of Nietzsche date from Walter Kaufmann
and his effort to free a "basically anti-political"
Nietzsche from his association with Nazism. 45 Kaufmann's
Nietzsche (first published in 1950) was the authoritative
Nietzsche, especially for English-speaking readers. Kaufmann
had made it acceptable after World War II to read Nietzsche
again. He dominated the field of Nietzsche scholarship and
was responsible for most of the available English
translations. Kaufmann, along with his contemporaries Arthur
Dante (who tried to assimilate Nietzsche to analytic
philosophy) and J.P. Stern, reads Nietzsche as a systematic
philosopher. Kaufmann's reading resolves Nietzsche's selfcontradiction and paradox according to an internal unity, in
which contradictions are only temporary stopping places.
Nietzsche's aphorisms are for Kaufmann ultimately unified by
their character as "thought experiments" striving for an
adequate means of expression for getting at "the objects
themselves" in which self-overcoming, not ambiguity, is the
key. 46 Kaufmann complained of Bertram that he "failed to see

45 Kaufmann 412.
46 Kaufmann 85.
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that the self-contradictions [were] merely the stuff of
legend and not typical of Nietzsche's thought." 47 He
assigned Nietzsche a place in "the grand tradition of
Western thought" and claimed that the core of Nietzsche's
thought was the Will to Power, which was not a metaphysical
concept but a psychological hypothesis inseparable from his
concept of sublimation. 48 However, Kaufmann rejects what his
reading of Nietzsche cannot account for -- the "dubious
doctrine" of the Eternal Return and most particularly
"woman."
For Kaufmann as for the other readers of Nietzsche
considered so far, "woman'' is not regarded as a significant
aspect of his philosophy. 49 It is tempting to correlate this
with a more general belief that women are not important and
that even a supposed misogyny can be ignored -- the irony is
that it is not there. If Kaufmann feels obliged to at least
note Nietzsche's remarks and account for them because by the
1950s they may have become increasingly embarrassing, it is
still only to dismiss them as having any bearing on what
Nietzsche "means." Kaufmann fails to see the significance of
Nietzsche's "woman" and reads her right out of his
interpretation. According to Kaufmann,

47 Kaufmann 14.
48 Kaufmann 204.
49 one exception is Karl Reinhardt (See page 30, above).

62

Nietzsche's writings contain many all too
human judgements -- especially about women
but these are philosophically irrelevant; and
ad hominem arguments against any philosophy
on the basis of such statements seems trivial
and hardly pertinent . . . . Nietzsche's
prejudices about women nSOd not greatly
concern the philosopher.
This is also the result of neglecting the importance of
style, and establishing a split between the philosophical
and the poetic Nietzsche. Kaufmann has had many students,
but two in particular have distinguished themselves as
Nietzsche scholars -- J. Hollingdale and Alexander Nehamas.
Interestingly enough, they have opposite reactions to
Kaufmann's "neglect" of style. Hollingdale adopts Kaufmann's
point of view and claims that Nietzsche's importance is in
his philosophy -- poetry is secondary. 51 Nehamas, on the
other hand, rejects this view, arguing that Nietzsche's many
styles are a part of his perspectivism. The multiplicity of
style attempts to suggest that there is no single neutral
language and to undermine the distinction between form and
content. Nietzsche avoids dogmatism in refusing to privilege
his authorial voice and in presenting his ideas as

5 o Kaufmann 84. Yet what are we to make of Kaufmann's
biographical remark about Nietzsche's intolerable situation
in which it is known "how Nietzsche felt about being
condemned to live in a fatherless household, alone with 5
women ... " This perhaps says more about Kaufmann's rejection
of the place of "woman" and her supposed irrelevance than
about Nietzsche's text.

51 Hollingdale 203.
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interpretations. 52 It is significant that there is a
generational difference between Hollingdale and Nehamas, the
latter representing more recent interpretative attempts in
Nietzsche reading that refuse the traditional split between
philosophy and literature.
The most recent phase of Nietzsche interpretation is
language oriented, paying as much, if not more, attention to
Nietzsche as a writer and his techniques for "unmasking"
truth, language, and thought. The key to these readings is
the experience of nihilism, which Heidegger in the 1930s was
the first to take seriously. Although many disagree with
Heidegger's interpretation, contemporary interpretations owe
a great deal to him and his intuition that the horizon of
nihilism was fundamental. That God is dead means all eternal
standards are gone by which truth and language traditionally
functioned or can be measured. As Daniel O'Hara says in his
introduction to Why Nietzsche Now?, "this most recent
appearance by Nietzsche has been as the linguistic
pathologist of the diverse signs of nihilism which are
constitutive of the entire tradition of Western culture from
the age of the Greeks." 53 This new valorization of language
and writing since the 1960s comes from revisionary readings

52 Alexander Nehamas 20-40.
53 Daniel O'Hara, ''Introduction," Why Nietzsche Now?
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985) vii-viii.
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of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche -- therefore, it is
necessary to turn to Heidegger's Nietzsche.
Recalling that Heidegger began his lectures against the
background of Baumler's interpretations, it is interesting
to note the similarities between them. Like Baumler,
Heidegger based his interpretation on the collection of
notes under the title The Will to Power. Also like Baumler,
Heidegger interpreted the Eternal Return as the impression
of being on becoming, although Heidegger does not reject the
Eternal Return but argues for the unity of the Nietzschean
themes of the Will to Power, the Eternal Return, and the
Revaluation of Values. Heidegger also uses Nietzsche's note
§617 in Will to Power similarly: taking the first line "To
impose upon becoming the character of being -- that is the
supreme will to power" out of context without considering
that the rest of the note does not bear out the meaning
attributed to it. 54 Thus the Eternal Return becomes the
fundamental metaphysical position of Nietzsche

"being as

a whole is Will to Power, and being as a whole is Eternal
Return of the same." 55 Heidegger argues that this
conjunction of the Will to Power and Eternal Return in
Nietzsche's thought returns philosophy full circle to the
Greeks -- being is and being becomes -- in such a way that

5 4 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 2) 201.
55 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 2) 198.
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Being "as such" is identified solely with the beingness of
beings as what is present and what is purely actual.
Heidegger assumes that Being, however enigmatic his own
attempt to think Being, "is" prior to and separate from man
as being. He regards traditional metaphysics as the study of
beings, which has always taken Being apriori and thus never
questioned Being as Being. Nietzsche brings metaphysics then
to its furthest development because there is no longer any
possibility for the question of Being separate from beings
themselves. Nietzsche "fails" to reach the thought of Being
as such. Heidegger betrays a longing, an "if only," for a
return to origins where Being is again possible as a
question and as a promise -- no longer forgotten in
"beings." The secret of Being is a deep truth, the
"unthought" horizon of cultural existence that man must
think more authentically. Rather than an overcoming that
tries to control, the overcoming of metaphysics ought to be
a "step back," a thinking that "no longer omits Being but
admits it: admits it into the originary, revealing
unconcealment of Being, which is Being itself." 56
Although clearly influenced by Baumler, Heidegger has
his own reasons for relegating Nietzsche to metaphysics.
Heidegger reads Nietzsche as bringing Nihilism to its
furthest development by reducing Being to value and will:

56 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 3) 227.
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"Thought in terms of the essence of nihilism, Nietzsche's
overcoming is merely the ful f i 11 ment of nihi 1ism. 1157 There
is not only nothing to Being itself, but nothing to beings
as well. Nietzsche's nihilism is an unauthentic nihilism
that does not know itself as such because it omits thinking
the essence of nihilism, the "default" of Being. This
default is Heidegger's way of speaking of Being as neither
pure presence nor pure absence but paradoxically both -- a
default that is at the same time a giving, a promise. Being
has historically withdrawn, yet leaves behind a place
DaSein -- in which presence and absence occur together in a
place that defines the essence of man. Nietzsche's nihilism
deals with actual nihilism but not with essential nihilism.
The essence of Truth -- man's relationship to Being -- is
abandoned for the principle of value, leading to what
Heidegger sees as having opened the way for planetary
dominion by machination and technology -- both the result of
an "unconditioned anthropomorphism" and a destructive will
to power. 58 Heidegger's concern, expressed in his essay
"Nihilism and the History of Being" in volume 3 of Krell's
translation, is against a "metaphysics of subjectivity" for
which technology has become an anonymous force that has
gained control and turned nature into a "standing reserve"
to the point of including man himself as a mere object for
57 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 3) 219.

58 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 3) 174.
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use. 59 In arguing that there is no meaning to life in itself
except what man himself puts there, Nietzsche wills man's
homelessness as such -- meaninglessness is now the only
thing that "makes sense. 1160
Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche puts an odd
spin to Nietzsche's writing. It willfully seems to ignore
the similarity between Nietzsche's thoughts and Heidegger's.
It may be that Heidegger was unwilling to credit Nietzsche
with having preceded him in his own insights. The similarity
becomes clear in the context of Heidegger's paradoxical
thinking of Being. Being is described by Heidegger as "not"
-- not presence but a withdrawal that in withdrawing
"remains in view," a duplicitous revealing/concealing selfveiled gift that promises Being itself. 61 Being itself stays
away:
Thus matters stand with the concealment of
Being in such a way that the concealment
conceals itself in itself. The staying away
of Being is Being itself in this very
default . . . . In its default Being veils
itself with itself. This veil that vanishes
for itself, which is the way Being itself
essentially occut~ in default, is the nothing
as Being itself.
59 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 3) 242; 248. See also
"The Question Concerning Technology," in Basic Writings
298.
GO Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 3) 173.
61 Krell, "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 4) 261; Heidegger,
Nietzsche (vol. 4) 215.
62 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 4) 214.
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Being as such is other than itself, so
decisively other that it even "is" not. 63
But Being as withdrawn gift, as self-veiled, is

precisely where we encounter Nietzsche's "woman," and
precisely the point at which Derrida turns Nietzsche against
Heidegger. Nietzsche's woman "

'give themselves,' even

when they -- give themselves." 64 Further, as David Farrell
Krell says, "If the 1936-37 lectures on will to power as art
overlook woman, those on eternal recurrence neglect
Dionysos; the two omissions ... are perhaps not
unrelated." 65 The Eternal Return is a matter of the moment - the wedding of chance and necessity -- in which eternity
is always decided. In other words, Eternal Return is time as
transition, and very close to Heidegger's notion in Being
and Time of ecstatic temporality -- time as transition as
such. 66 In the Eternal Return, "Nothing ends; all begins
again, the other is still the same, midnight is only a
covered-over noon, and the highest noon is the abyss of

63 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 4) 215.
64 Nietzsche §361. Translated by Kaufmann, the line
reads "That they "put on something" even when they take off
everything" (317). In a footnote he gives the original
German: "Dass sie "sich geben," selbst noch, wenn sie -sich geben." Derrida relies on the original. The "scare
quotes" indicate a duplicity.
65 Krell, "Analysis," Nietzsche (vol. 2) 275.
66 Krell, "Analysis," Nietzsche (vol. 2) 278.
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light from which we can never escape." 67 The Apollonian noon
as absolute presence and Zarathustra's noon as the sign of
Eternal Return are impossible to separate, indicating
Nietzsche's problematization of his own thought in the
vicious circle. In the Eternal Return beings are not beings
as selves as Heidegger would have it, but have no continuous
given identity. One finds that one is always already other - Nietzsche and Heidegger would seem to be standing on the
edge of the same abyss. Several of the readers of
Heidegger's Nietzsche have commented on the difficulty of
separating one from the other -- whether it is Heidegger's
Nietzsche or Nietzsche's Heidegger that is being read.
Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Derrida,
Paul Ricouer, Jacques Lacan, Sarah Kofman, and Michel
Foucault are some contemporary philosophical and literary
figures interested in language who have all been influential
in the study of rhetoric -- and who have all been influenced
by Nietzsche. 68 The editors of Nietzsche's rhetorical works
argue that in Nietzsche's use of Ciceronian rhetoric to
attack nineteenth century philosophy "it is possible that
Nietzsche, like the Sophists and the Italian Renaissance
Humanists, has been responsible for a historical reversal of
67 Maurice Blanchet, "The Limits of Experience:
Nihilism" in The New Nietzsche 126.

68 Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, David J. Parent,
eds., "Introduction" to Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and
Language xxi.
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the intellectual (or possibly a reunion) of these two
historically competitive fields." 69 It is also remarkable
that so much of the "new Nietzsche" that has taken the
"linguistic turn" has been the creation of French thinkers.
In part, this is the result of the death of Walter Kaufmann,
which left a vacuum in the control of Nietzsche scholarship,
and in part the result of the development of a French school
of Nietzsche interpretation that moved away from Heidegger
in primarily two, not unrelated, directions: deconstruction
and archeological/genealogica1. 70 The name "Derrida"
signifies the former and the name "Foucault" the latter
within Nietzschean interpretation, with a third figure in
Giles Deleuze, whose Nietzsche interpretation is not
assimilative to either direction but certainly operates in
the same trajectory. The projects of all three could be said
to be an extension of the questions Nietzsche poses in a
passage from Daybreak:
Subsequent questions -- whenever a person
reveals something, one can ask: what is it
supposed to conceal? From what is it supposed
to divert the eyes? What prejudice is it
supposed to arouse? And additionally: how for
does the subtlety of this diss~Tulation go?
and in what way has it failed?
69 Gilman xii.
70 See Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the
Politics of Transfiguration (London: University of
California Press Ltd, 1988) 311; Guzzoni x; O'Hara viii;
Gilman xvii.

71 Nietzsche, Daybreak, trans. Hollingdale (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987) §523.
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All three are anti-systematic, anti-humanist (in the
metaphysical, hermeneutical sense), and antirepresentational. Common to all three as well is an
interdisciplinary hybrid approach, one that refuses to
confine itself to traditional academic divisions or the
conventional methods of philosophy but annexes new contexts
and methods from other fields. All three are concerned in
some form with the discourse of "woman." Woman appears in
their texts in a Nietzschean valorization of "woman" that
turns on what has been left out of or "other" to traditional
philosophical discourse in order to disrupt the concepts of
logic, truth, and presence. Alice Jardine has suggested a
neologism for this proliferation of the metaphor "woman"
with her Nietzschean attributes: gynesis -the putting into discourse of "woman" as that
process diagnosed in France as intrinsic to
the condition of modernity; indeed, the
valorization of the feminine, woman, and her
obligatory, that is historical, connotations,
as somehow intrinsic to new and neces;~ry
modes of thinking, writing, speaking.
In the wake of Nietzsche's announcement of the end of
man and his description of the subject as a fiction, all
three also reinterpret the western Cartesian notion of the
human subject, rejecting the notion of the transparent selfconsciousness of the individual subject with the aim of
eliminating the subject as the privileged center of truth,
72 Alice Jardine 25. This valorization is the subject
of the following chapter.
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knowing, language and power. Just as Nietzsche displaced the
will from the conscious control of the individual to the inbetween anonymity of the play of forces, these writers
emphasize the unconscious aspects of language and power.
They turn to the investigation of where and how the
invention of the subject developed.
In The Gay Science Nietzsche asks:
"Where could you find a history of love, of
avarice, of envy, of conscience, of pious
respect for tradition, or of cruelty? Even a
comparative history of law or at least o;
punishment is so far lacking completely. 3
Here can be seen in embryonic form the projects of Michel
Foucault, some of which include Discipline and Punish,

~

History of Sexuality, The Archeology of Knowledge, and

~

Order of Things. Foucault uses Nietzsche's genealogy as a
research strategy, an approach to history that emphasizes
discontinuities and arbitrariness rather than continuous,
progressive development. Foucault rejects universals,
intentionality, and the search for hidden meanings. He takes
up Nietzsche's rejection of both the "true" and "apparent"
worlds for the surface play of interpretation, in which
everything is already an interpretation. Genealogy is
against the search for origins and causes. It looks instead
for "the details and accidents that accompany every

73 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §7.
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beginning." 74 Foucault refuses causal explanations

social

practises and customs are instead studied as "sign chains"
of ever new interpretations, transformations, and
ruptures. 75 History is a matter of relations of force and
domination, in which Foucault looks for the local strategies
of power and the forms of knowledge that enable them to
operate. Nietzsche's attack on the "will to truth" as a
disguised form of the will to power is important to
Foucault's understanding of the interrelationship of power
and knowledge and his use of history as a means to engage in
local struggles against reified interpretations. The body
itself is changed and defined by cultural practices and
interpretation. Foucault rejected along with Nietzsche the
idea of the subject, which becomes for Foucault the locus of
institutional practices within the discourse of a particular
society. Thus an interpretation is required of how we came
to be constituted as subjects. Foucault never explicitly
refers to "woman" but her Nietzschean attribute as "distance
itself" occupies a significant place in his work, that of
the play of forces "made possible by the space which defines

74 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in
Foucault Reader ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books,
1984) 80.
75 Paul Bove, "Mendacious Innocents, or, The Modern
Genealogist as Conscientious Intellectual: Nietzsche,
Foucault, Said" in Why Nietzsche Now? 382.
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them." 76 This interaction of forces has, in Foucault's
words, a place of confrontation that is "as Nietzsche
demonstrates ... a "non place," a pure distance [or]
interstice " in which is staged "the endlessly repeated play
of domination." 77
Part of Foucault's Nietzscheanism comes by way of
Georges Bataille (1897-1962), a reader of Nietzsche in the
1930s and 40s who has had a great deal of importance to
postmodern thought, although less studied than Heidegger.
Foucault himself proclaims Bataille "one of the most
important writers of this century." 78 Bataille is a strange
interpreter of Nietzsche, in fact, his commentary ..5J.!...t.
Nietzsche (1945) is largely autobiographical, because
Bataille feels that to write "on" Nietzsche would be to turn
him into a dead object of knowledge. 79 Bataille is a "post
structuralist" 80 already in the post war period, whose works
combine Nietzsche with Sade's radically sovereign individual
in playing

with notions of excess, transgression and

76 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault:
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1982) 109.
77 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" 85.
78 Cited in Allan Megill 188.
79 Denis Hollier, Against Architecture: The Writings of
Georges Bataille, trans. Betsy Wing (Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 1989) 26.
80 Hollier ix.
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perversity -- the breaking of taboos and his writing of the
sacred as a fusion of sex, violence, obscenity, and
spirituality. A general relationship to the work of Bataille
can be seen in Derrida's association of writing with the
erotic and the endless play of signifiers and in Foucault's
study of architectures (Discipline and Punish), the body,
and transgression. Bataille was concerned with writing as
something non-representational, non-priviledged,
transgressive, and heterogeneous. He rejected fixed
meanings, form, unity, being, transcendence, purpose, and
morality for the affirmation of non-sense, even insanity
(Bataille was drawn to Nietzsche's insanity as the sacrifice
of an extreme individual). In Bataille "woman", especially
as Krell's configuration of woman/sensuality/death is not
postponed, and she appears in the form of the labyrinth and
Ariadne's thread, both major motifs of Bataille's work.
Bataille writes that he sees Nietzsche's theme as that of
the total man and the problem of action. All action is
particular and limiting, subordinating the individual's
total character to a particular result. 81 The problem is
then to transcend action: "Life remains whole only when not
subordinated to a precise object which transcends it.
Totality in this sense is essentially freedom." 82 Freedom

81 Georges Bataille, "On Nietzsche: The Will to Chance"
October 36 (1986): 52.
82 Bataille 52.
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becomes the freedom from all constraint and taboo, and thus
associated with evil.

Bataille admires Nietzsche'ss

assessment of the value of evil, even referring to Nietzsche
as "the philosopher of evil. 1183 Such abandonment is
available only to the individual in extremis, and is
reflected in Bataille's reading of Nietzsche's will to power
as the Will to Chance and the Eternal Return as pure
aimlessness

the rejection of all goals and solutions for

total risk.
Of the three "versions" of current Nietzschean
interpretation I have taken as paradigmatic, Giles Deleuze
offers the most systematic -- systematic, however, in a
deceptive sense. Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy is based
on an analysis of the dualisms of active and reactive in
Nietzsche's thought in relation to those of affirmation and
negation. Nietzsche's Eternal Return becomes the synthesis
of active and reactive forces and the Will to Power its
synthetic principle -- a system "as rigorous as the Kantian
one," which transmutes nihilism and becomes the power of
affirming. 84 Affirmation, to be unconditional, requires its
own affirmation. Ariadne is the affirmative woman, the first
positive feminine power, whose purpose in the system as

83 Bataille 50.
84 Giles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh
Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) 68-70.
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Dionysus' fiancee is this unconditional affirmation. 85 The
paradox here is that Deleuze, a philosopher of difference
like Derrida and Foucault, applies a traditional systematic
strategy to Nietzsche interpretation in which Nietzsche's
work becomes a philosophy of will. 86 However, Deleuze uses
this dualistic analysis as a strategic principle, a
temporary construction or "story" that can be abandoned
nomadically -an explanation that works by redescribing
events so that they fit into a particular
story put together for a particula9 practical
purpose in a particular situation. 7
In Nietzsche and Philosophy this purpose is to use Nietzsche
to reject Hegelian dialectics and replace them with an
affirmation of difference rather than its negation:
The eternal return is this highest power, the
synthesis of affirmation which finds its
principle in the will. The lightness of that
which affirms against the weight of the
negative; the games of the will to power
against the labor of the dialectic; the
affirmation of affirmation again~~ that
famous negation of the negation.
In "Nomadic Thought" Deleuze describes Nietzsche as the
dawn of counterculture -- the refusal of codification and
85 Deleuze 186. For Ariadne as the "first positive
feminine power," the "feminine power emancipated" see
Deleuze 14-20.
86 Hugh Tomlinson, "Nietzsche on the Edge of Town:
Deleuze and Reflexivity" in Exceedingly Nietzsche (London
and New York: Rootledge, 1988) 151.
87 Tomlinson 159.
88 Deleuze 197.
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the notion of style as politics. 89 Deleuze applies the term
nomadic to Nietzsche because it is the nomads who evade the
codes of settled peoples:
But if Nietzsche does not belong to
philosophy, it is perhaps because he was the
first to conceive of another kind of
discourse as counter-philosophy. This
discourse is above all nomadic; its statement
can be conceived as the products of a mobile
war machine and not the utterances of a
rational, administrative machinery, whose
philoso~sers would be bureaucrats of pure
reason.
Derrida is the reader of Nietzsche whose interpretation
is the closest to my own -- the first chapter of this thesis
can be regarded as an interpretation of Nietzsche that is
also an interpretation of Derrida's Spurs. Against readers
who either reject Nietzsche's "woman" as misogynistic, or
would ignore her as unworthy of consideration, Derrida takes
"woman" to be extremely important to Nietzsche's text.
Derrida claims in Spurs that "it is impossible to dissociate
the questions of art, style, and truth from the question of
woman." 91 He uses "woman" to provide an alternative
interpretation to Heidegger's Nietzsche that does not reject
Heidegger entirely, as Heidegger's rejection of the
metaphysics of presence is crucial to Derrida's own work.
Derrida
89 Deleuze, "Nomadic Thought" 142-143.
90 Deleuze, "Nomadic Thought" 149.
91 Jacques Derrida, Spurs 71.
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attempts to show that Heidegger's own path of
escape from metaphysics could be considered
as operative in Nietzsche's text as well.
This is done in terms of wh~~ Derrida calls
the question of the propre.
Propre has connotations of proper-ty -- belonging, owning,
giving, taking, mastery, and possession. Derrida's propre is
similar to Heidegger's manipulation of Ereignis,
Eigentlichkeit, and eigen-en as terms for the mysterious
granting of Time and Being that is governed by the duplicity
of revealing and concealing, but which is never confronted
in Heidegger's interpretation in the figure of the woman in
Nietzsche's text. 93 Heidegger's interpretation is shown to
be inadequate by its lack of attention to woman. Derrida
brings Heidegger into his reading of Nietzsche with
Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's "The History of an
Error" in Twilight of the Idols. 94 Heidegger's commentary
ignores the phrase "it becomes woman" and thus like all
philosophy before him fails to realize that together woman
and truth have a history

the eternal feminine that

92 Alan Schrift, "Reading Derrida Reading Heidegger
Reading Nietzsche," Research in Phenomenology 14 (1984): 98.
93 Krell, "A Hermeneutics of Discretion," Research in
Phenomenology 15 (1985): 2.
94 Nietzsche, "How the "Real World" at last Became a
Fable," subtitled "The History of an Error," Twilight of the
Idols/The Antichrist 40-41. The part in question reads: "The
real world, unattainable for the moment, but promised to the
wise, the pious, the virtuous man ("to the sinner who
repents"). (Progress of the idea: it grows more refined,
more enticing, more incomprehensible -- it becomes woman, it
becomes Christian ... ). The passage ends in "with the real
world we have also abolished the apparent world ... Incipit
Zarathustra.
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Nietzsche's affirmative woman disrupts. Nietzsche's "woman"
and Heidegger's Being both have the same essential predicate
-- the gift that is a dissimulation, neither a giving nor a
taking away. However, where Heidegger's

thought of Being

ends in "mystery," the primordial absence in all presence,
Nietzsche's "woman" has no mystery, no deep secrets. She is
all surface, and for Derrida the infinite extension of a
chain of signifiers -- there is no Being to be forgotten in
the first place.
Spurs is used as part of Derrida's challenge to a
hermeneutics which searches for the true meaning of the text
in the intention of the author. 95 He attacks Heidegger's
hermeneutical claim to know Nietzsche's own "unthought" or
what Nietzsche "really" wanted to say which then reads into
Nietzsche's text truths about the question of Being that do
not fit there. Heidegger's interpretation belongs to
hermeneutics because the question of whether Nietzsche
merely inverted Platonism, reversing the ideal and the
sensual, or exceeded Platonism requires thinking Nietzsche's
intended meaning. 96 Derrida's aim in reading instead allows
meaning to be produced through the activity of reading
rather than finding a meaning already present in the text.

95 Schrift, "Reading" 89-90; 105.
96 Derrida 83.
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By attending to the metaphors of "woman," "truth," and
"castration" in Nietzsche's text and their common
attributes, Derrida argues that woman is but one name for
the untruth of truth. 97 As veiling dissimulation, woman
cannot be pinned down -- she neither believes in truth nor
castration, nor in their opposites. Derrida refers to this
as the heterogeneity of Nietzsche's text -- the absence of a
system that would entirely account for Nietzsche's positions
on "woman.•• 98 Truth in Nietzsche's texts is irreducibly
plural, and with this plurality reading is "freed from the
horizon of meaning, the truth of being." 99 Woman is the
question of style, a style more powerful than content. She
already knows that the question of the propre
(possess/possessed, giving/taking) is undecidable

that

the event of Being is a non-event, and an abyss. And thus
Derrida concludes,
A joyful wisdom shows it well: there never
has been the style, the simulacrum, the
woman. Therio8ever has been the sexual
difference.
This brings to an end a brief history of Nietzsche's
readers at a point -- the refusal of the sexual difference
as such

where a move to another branch of the Nietzschean

97 Derrida 51.
9 8 See Chapter I 30.
99 Derrida 107.

lOO Derrida 139.
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interpretative family tree, that of French feminist theory
is called for, particularly where "woman" is concerned
(although the writers involved in this grouping might be
uncomfortable with such a lineage). There are others in the
field of Nietzsche interpretation who could be mentioned,
particularly Paul DeMan, Maurice Blanchet, and Pierre
Klossowski, but the general outlines of recent Nietzsche
interpretation should now be clear. The recent proliferation
of Nietzsche interpretation has been remarkable and is
related to the challenges to traditional methods of
interpretation that what is termed deconstruction,
poststructuralism, or postmodernism are making. What should
also be clear are the political aspects of recent Nietzsche
interpretation. Despite Kaufmann's attempt to remove
Nietzsche from politics, Nietzsche is ever more used in
political battles, although the use to which he is now put
is more appropriate than that of earlier periods. Whether it
is Foucault's microstruggles against entrenched
interpretations and strategies of domination, Deleuze's
nomadic war machine, or Derrida's more literary but no less
political attack on phallocentrism, Nietzsche is being used
as a subversive force against the traditional hegemony of
rationalism and rationalist systems of meaning. The writings
of the last anti-political German have now become the
"politics of style" or the "politics of difference," which
have the aim of disrupting all centrist discourses
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be they phallo-centric, ethno-centric, theocentric, anthropo-centric, or logo-centric
every discourse which tends to create
undisturbable limits and order, hegemonic
rule, .or P1bYileged, hierarchical
opposites.
As Nietzsche himself recognized, no one can get more out of
his texts than what they bring to them in the first place:
Ultimately, nobody can get more out of
things, including books, than he already
knows. For what one lacks access
from
experience one will have no ear. 1

&9

lOl J.D. Caputo, "Three Transgressions: Nietzsche,
Heidegger, Derrida" Research in Phenomenology 15 (1985): 75.
102 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 261.

CHAPTER I I I

FROM METAPHOR TO THEORY
In the refusal of the sexual difference as such
Nietzsche's use of the metaphor "woman'' has become important
within Derridean deconstruction and the use of
deconstructive theory by certain woman theorists in France
whose work is only now becoming well known in American
academics. For these theoretical writers who would
deconstruct even sexual identity, "woman" still functions in
the Nietzschean sense in which she "is" no longer the
opposite of "man'' but the very subversion of the opposition
masculinity/femininity:
In "woman" I see something that cannot be
represented, something that is not said,
something a£ove and beyond nomenclature and
ideologies.
Julia Kristeva
If woman has always functioned "within" the
discourse of man, a signifier that has always
referred back to the opposite signifier ...
it is time for her to dislocate this
"within," to explode it, turn it around, and
seize it, ... biting that tongue with her
very own teeth to invent f~r herself a
language to get inside of.
Helene Cixous
1 Julia Kristeva, "Woman can never be defined," N.fil:f
French Feminisms 137.
2 Helen Cixous, "Laugh of the Medusa," New French
Feminisms 257.
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[Woman] is neither one nor two ... She
renders any definition in~dequate. Moreover
she has no "proper name."
Whose twisted character is her inability to
say what she represents. The quest of the
"object" becomes a game of Chinese boxes.
Infinitely receding. The most amorphous with
regard to ideas, the most obviously "thing,"
if you like, the most opaque matter, opens
upon a mirror all the purer in that it knows
and is known to have no reflections. ... But
what if the object started to speak? 4
Luce Irigaray
There is also the voice of Sarah Kofman, who calls for
the end of all oppositions, that of man as
well as of woman, to the advantage of a
"feminine jouissance," if by feminin5 one
understands undecidable oscillation.
Their concern is with language and the exclusion of women
from language and the linguistic system, which they argue
has been, in its structure and history, subject to an order
that is patrilinear and therefore masculine. 6
The women theorists -- among whom Luce Irigaray, Helene
Cixous, Julia Kristeva, and Sarah Kofman are most prominent
-- take as their own starting points the deconstructive

3 Luce Irigaray, "This sex which is not one,"
French Feminisms 101.

New

4 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, trans.
Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985)
134-135.

5 Sarah Kofman, quoted in Alice Jardine, Gynesis 140.
The word jouissance in French is translated as pleasure,
enjoyment, here associated with feminine sexuality and a
certain excess.
6 Gayatri Spivak, "French Feminism in an International
Frame," Yale French Studies 62 (1981): 172.
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writing of Derrida and/or Lacanian psychoanalysis. 7

They

have been grouped together under the label "French
feminism," but because so grouped should not be understood
to be in agreement with each other or even feminist. They
are better described as anti-feminist in the same sense that
writers like Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze are antihumanist, rejecting ideas of universality or essentialism
that claim common identities for all "men" or all "women" or
an autonomous identity for the individual self. As such,
this concern with "woman" is different from that of
traditional feminism, which has concentrated on the social
and political condition of female individuals assumed to
have not only autonomous individual identities but a shared
identity as "women" as their basis for action.
I may seem to be leaving Nietzsche behind here, yet his
writing has set the agenda for deconstruction or
postmodernism, including the new French feminists, whether
or not they agree with his "woman." 8 His themes and phrasing
appear in the work and styles of the French theorists. The
relationship that exists between Nietzsche and his French
readers is intertextual, which indicates the textual
reinscription of Nietzsche's work in the work of the writers

7 Jardine 181.
8 See Allan Megill 's Prophets of Extremity for an
extended discussion of the importance of Nietzsche to both
modernism and postmodernism.
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with whom I am here concerned -- Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault,
Lacan, Irigaray, Cixous, Kofman, and Kristeva. This
reinscription is more than a matter of quotation, direct
reference, and common themes. It is more -- to use the word
"text" according to its etymological roots in the Latin
"texere" (to weave) -- that Nietzsche forms the warp upon
which the later complex fabric of deconstruction and
theoretical "feminism" has been woven,

just as Nietzsche

used the canons of Western culture as the warp of his own
writings.
In the work of these French critics "woman" has become
a prevalent metaphor -- politically and rhetorically since
1968 Roland Barthes' "metaphor without brakes." No longer
just a question of the interpretation of Nietzsche, "woman"
has acquired a life of her own. Alice Jardine, among others,
notes how, whether in the work of Derrida, Lacan, Deleuze,
Lyotard, Baudrillard, Michel Serres, in Foucault and Barthes
as a "present absence," and in the writings of the French
feminists,
"she" is created from the close exploration
of semantic chains whose elements have
·
changed textual as well as conceptual
positions, at least in terms of valorization:
from time to space, the same to other,
paranoia to hysteria, city to labyrinth,
mastery to non-mastery, truth to fiction. 9

9 Jardine 38.
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This "woman" is not biological but linguistic -- a question
of language, and the role of the unconscious, the subject
and the symbolic. Basic to Derrida's notion of writing,
Foucault's discourse, and Deleuze's machines is their
critique of the concept of the subject. In place of the
subject is proposed the space of alterity within which the
subject is configured. This space -- otherness, chaos,
distance -- has always connoted the feminine in Western
thought and thus the valorization of alterity, difference,
and otherness

involves "a putting into discourse of

'woman. ,.,lO This discourse owes a significant debt to
Nietzsche.
"Woman" thus becomes part of the twentieth century
Western epistemological crisis over certainty and
representation. 11 In general it is a question of loss of
control and responses to this loss -- the "death" of the
Cartesian subject, dialectics, and metaphysical Truth, and
the loss or dislocation of a Western cultural identity based
on what is white, European, and male. 12

Rather than shore

up failing ideals, postmodern writers characteristically
valorize this loss and affirm difference instead of
lO Jardine 115.
ll See Introduction, above.

12 Jardine 68; Jardine, "Opaque Texts and Transparent
Contexts: The Political Difference of Julia Kristeva" in~
Poetics of Gender, ed. Carolyn G. Heilbrun and Nancy K.C
Miller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 100.
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identity. In doing so, they turned to Nietzsche's critique
of truth, Freud's science of the unconscious, and
Heidegger's destruction of presence as onto-theology, as
texts already elaborating this loss of control. 13
One feminist critic, Susan Borda, has aptly noted that
the dominant philosophical dualisms are overdetermined with
respect to race, gender, and class such that the
hierarchical opposition of reason/unreason may be coded many
different ways, as, for example, male/female, white/African,
or spiritual/material. 14 The second half of each opposition
is defined as different and marginal. She says:
It is no accident, surely, that the
beginnings of the current philosophical reassessment of objectivism and foundationalism
followed close on the heels of the public
emergence, in the 1960s and 1970s, of those
groups margi~~lized by the dominant
metaphysics.
Traditionally authority and credibility have been granted to
those who can transcend everything that would mark them as
different and therefore marginal, subjective, and
unreliable. 16 The anti-humanism the postmodern writers
espouse is based on a rejection of traditional movements of

13 Jardine, Gynesis 71; Jardine, "Opaque Texts'' 101.
14 Susan Bardo, "Feminist Skepticism and the 'Maleness'
of Philosophy," The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 626.
15 Bardo 628.
16 Naomi Scheman, "Further Thoughts on a 'Theoretics of
Heterogeneity,"' The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 631.
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liberation because of a conviction, in the wake of
Nietzsche, that the western conceptions of the True, the
Good, the Right, the Ethical, and the Natural are bound up
with means of oppression -- and the complicity between
oppression and Western ideas of the Same. 17
I indicated above that the new French feminisms -- as
anti or post-feminisms -- take as theoretical starting
points the work of Derrida and Lacan.

In order to follow

what has become of "woman" in these new feminisms and off er
a general survey and analysis of this work by writers who
are still "readers of Nietzsche" (once removed), a further
description of Derridean thought and the introduction of
Lacanian theory is necessary. Although Lacan is a starting
point, the French feminists and Derrida generally write
against Lacan's phallocentrisrn. Alice Jardine describes this
as a "battle" between Lacanian and Nietzschean
philosophies. 18
Lacan is known for his structuralist interpretation of
Freud which defines the unconscious as "structured like a
language" -- not only man speaks but in and by man language
speaks. 19

Thus there is an affinity between Lacan and

17 Jardine, "Opaques Texts" 99-100.
1 8 Jardine, Gynesis 149.
19 Spivak, "Translator's Preface," Of Grammatology by
Jacques Derrida (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1976) lxii.
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Derrida in their concern for textuality. The relationship of
Lacan and Derrida is complex and not relevant here except
for the way in which "woman" has become (always been)
involved. The difference appears in Lacan's notion of the
privileged signifier.
When the child enters what Lacan calls the symbolic,
it enters/acquires language. At the same time it has
developed a new "linguistically imprisoned" concept of
itself as a subject -- alienated from the old, from itself
as it was before language with the mother. This "self" as a
referent is lost, and unknowable -- the unconscious, which
Lacan refers to as Other.

It is beyond language, feminine,

lost but ever pursued and desired. For Lacan, "signifiers
are the symbols that relate the subject through the
structure of desire to the unconscious." The "master"
signifier of these signifiers is the phallus
For the phallus is a signifier, a signifier
whose function ... lifts the veil perhaps
from the function it performed in the
mysteries. For it is the signifier intended
to designate as a whole the effects of the
signified, in that the signifier con~btions
them by its presence as a signifier.

20 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection (New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 1977) 285. According to Spivak,
"Preface," lxv. "This is not the phallus as an actual organ,
penis, or clitoris [but] the phallus as a signifier that can
come to take the place of all signifiers signifying all
desires for al 1 absences" (Spivak, "Preface" lxv).
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The phallus is the privileged signifier of
that mark in which the role of th~ logos is
joined with the advent of desire. 1
The language the child enters into is governed by the
symbolics of the phallus or "male subject as absolute
metaphor" and the child's identity fixed according to a
system of paternal names. This Law of the Father through the
mediation of the Phallus denies a "place" to women except at
second hand. 22 Thus for Lacan sexual difference is built
into language, thought, and culture. Presence is masculine
and absence or lack feminine, and the

woman as mother is

left behind in the narcissism of the "Pre-symbolic" once the
child has created (or projected) his/her fiction of a self
in/through language. The Law of the Father controls. Thus
femininity cannot be expressed and the woman's identity is
unstable. 23
There is no Woman [La Femme], with a definite
article for designating the universal. There
is no Woman because -- I have already
ventured the term, and why should I think
twice about it 24 with regard to her essence,
she is not all.
Woman is what escapes discourse -- Woman as Other, as man's
unconscious. To attempt to speak outside of the Law of the
Father would result in hysteria, or psychosis. Woman is
21 Lacan 287.

22 Nye 139-140.
23 Nye 140-141.
24 Lacan, Seminar XX: Encore 68 (cited in Jardine,
Gynesis 164).
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imprisoned ever more firmly is a system in which only men
can speak -- Other in the sense in which she has always been
other and silent. 25 Lacan makes "woman" Other in the sense
of the Eternal Feminine.
Derrida argues that any privileged signifier is yet
another metaphysical, transcendental longing for presence,
similar to Heidegger's hope of a return to Being. Lacan is
an example of that imposed patriarchal authority that
feminism must subvert. 26 For Derrida signifier and signified
-- or word and meaning -- are interchangeable, not merely
arbitrarily related within a structural system. Nothing
"is," there are only continuous sign chains of differences
or traces to be deciphered, the sign a tool to be used
provisionally. Meaning has no unique referent but
"disseminates'' itself endlessly. 27 There can be no
transcendental signified (Being) or signifier (Phallus) that
stabilizes the system, nothing behind or beyond language
that serves as an ultimate referent or truth.
25 In the words of Helene Cixous, "Here we encounter
the inevitable man-with-rock, standing erect in his old
Freudian realm, in the way that, to take the figure back to
the point where linguistics is conceptualizing it "anew,"
Lacan preserves it in the sanctuary of the phallus (¢)
"sheltered" from castration's lack! Their "symbolic" exists,
it holds power -- we, the sowers of disorder, know it only
too well" (Cixous, "Laugh of the Medusa," New French
Feminisms 255).
26 Nye 188.
27 Spivak, "Preface" xvi. The affinity between
Nietzsche and Derrida should also be clear here.
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According to Derrida and the French feminist writers, a
feminist reversal of the paternal power would simply
reinstate phallocentrism in the form of an inverted
sexism. 28

There is also the complicity of phallocentrism

with logocentrism within/as

metaphysics. With his concept

of the Phallus as master signifier to our symbolic system of
meaning Lacan has taken this implicit relationship and made
it explicit. Metaphysics cannot be escaped or replaced,
because new alternate truths still affirm the logical,
metaphysical presence of truth as such. Thus for Derrida the
necessary tactic is not only a reversal which valorizes the
feminine, but a play or parody with symbolic structures and
with truth, as Nietzsche's Woman played with the truth -- an
affirmative deconstruction that displaces rather than
confronts. Language is shown not to be structured around a
transcendental signifier that provides a center for meaning
but a kind of writing, a writing that "obliterates what it
imprints and disperses what is says." 29 Writing is the trace
of a permanent alterity:

28 Derrida, Spurs 65: "And in truth, they too are men,
those women feminists so derided by Nietzsche. Feminism is
nothing but the operation of a woman who aspires to be like
a man."
29 Stefano Agnost.i, "Introduction," Spurs 23.
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Nietzsche puts "knowing" under erasure, Freud
"the psyche," and Heidegger, explicitly,
"Being" ... the name of this gesture effacing
the presence of a thing and yet keeping it
legible, in Derrida's lexicon is "writing,"
-- the gesture that both frees us from and
guards us ~bthin, the metaphysical
enclosure.
Thus feminism in the form found in Derrida, Cixous,
Irigaray, Kristeva, and Kofman goes beyond the attempt to
define rights and equalities for women within the existing
system to the question of the relationship of that system to
existing notions of truth and the necessary subversion of
metaphysical truth as that "space" where gender, culture,
and power have been established for Western society in a
particular way. They make explicit a kind of feminism that,
as I have tried to argue, was implicit already in
Nietzsche's work. Their "woman" is outside of all mastery
and appropriation -- for "woman" meaning is multiple:
The question of the woman suspends the
decidable opposition of true and non-true and
inaugurates the epochal regime of quotation
marks which is to be enforced for every
concept belonging to the sy~tem of
philosophical decidability.
It would seem unlikely that such a system as Lacan's
could find a place in feminist criticism, yet some
feminists, particularly Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray
(who was Lacan's student until she challenged his theories

30 Spivak, "Preface"
31 Derrida, Spurs 107.

xl i.
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in The Speculum of the Other Woman) found in Lacan a
powerful analysis of patriarchal relations. 32 In accepting
this analysis, both argue that women can operate only as
"other." Any new feminist position would have to be
articulated from the more difficult position of otherness
and decentralization.

Lacan's theories are not accepted as

absolute, but as a story of a particular kind -- the
paternal logos -- that has ruled throughout Western
civilization. It cannot be simply overturned, but can be
subverted

-- ''mined" for gaps and inconsistencies. 33 One

way they attempt to do this is through the valorization of
the maternal. All four theorists assert in some form this
maternal, the rediscovery of the mother
Oedipal. 34

the pre-

All recognize a certain valorization of woman as

a means toward a destabilization of the dominant hierarchy
in the "rehabilitation of the repressed." In claiming to
expose the connections of gender to Western habits of
thought, all of these theorists aim to subvert the
traditional hierarchy from within or from its margins.

32 Nye 141 (Canceling of Seminar in Nye 169 (73n)).
33 Nye 190.
34 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and
Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1982) 173. See also Domna Stanton, "Difference on
Trial: A Critique of the Maternal Metaphors in Cixous,
Irigaray, and Kristeva," The Poetics of Gender 159.
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Yet, if feminine practise is negative, undermining the
stability of established structures, it must avoid a retreat
into separatism. Julia Kristeva argues that women must both
enter the masculine world and undermine patriarchal claims
to authority and logical certainty. 35 A permanent analytical
attitude -- "autocritique" -- must be maintained that
prevents the feminine, the maternal, the "l'ecriture au
maternal" from ceasing to be a heuristic tool and becoming a
new dominance. 36
For Kristeva, the critical force of Freud and Lacan is
their outline of the symbolic contract as one of sacrifice
or castration, in which language constitutes meaning through
a separation of the subject from a presumed state of nature
and the introduction of a network of differences. 37 The
question for women today, Kristeva argues, is "What can be
our place in the symbolic contract?"

the social

contract. 38 Whether this is a matter of structure or a
sociohistorical conjuncture is difficult to evaluate. She
argues that "we can speak only about a structure observed in
a sociohistorical context, which is that of Christian,

35 Nye 148.
36 Domna

c. Stanton, "Difference on Trial" 173-174.

37 Kristeva, "Women's Time," Critical Theory Since

ed. Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle (Tallahassee:
Florida State University Press, 1986) 477.

l.i§.5.,

38 Kristeva 477.
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Western civilization and its lay ramifications. 1139

She

identifies two feminist positions that have operated so far,
one a complicity with this contract to acquire what power it
offers, the other variations on a utopian countersociety
that posits a maternal myth of the archaic mother. 40
Kristeva advocates a third attitude that understands the
very dichotomy man/woman as metaphysics, a feminism that
breaks free of a belief in Woman and "brings out the
singularity of each woman." 41 She argues that the violence
of the social contract needs to be relocated in the interior
of every identity so that
the habitual and increasingly explicit
attempt to fabricate a scapegoat victim as
f oundress of a society or countersociety may
be replaced by the analysis of the
potentialities of victim/executioner which
character~~e each identity, each subject,
each sex.
Unlike Irigaray and Cixous, Kristeva refuses to prescribe
any particular relationship to the "feminine" other than
39 Kristeva 477.

°

4 Kristeva 477-481. If Kristeva herself calls for a
maternal semiotics (Nye 142), the purpose is not the
creation of a matriarchal society but an exploration of the
"before" of language. If the Mother must be repressed, she
remains as an abyss -- the dangerous Mother -- and possible
threat. Further, many feminists would object that they do
not fit either of these two categories, or find them
troubling. Kristeva is quite explicit in her claims that
"the assumption by women of executive, industrial, and
cultural power has not, up to the present time, radically
changed the nature of this power" (Kristeva 479).
41 Kristeva 483.
42 Kristeva 484.
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women's need to both enter and undermine the masculine
world. 43 Her work has focused on the politics of male
sexuality and the examination of the operation of the
"feminine" in patriarchal thought. 44
Where Kristeva's primary texts are those of Freud and
Lacan, the primary text of both Irigaray and Cixous is
Derrida. Luce Irigaray is critical of Lacan. 45 Yet he and
Derrida, particularly Derrida's Spurs, are indirectly
present in her texts. 46 Her writing is also a question of
style --

fluid, figural, parodic, allusive -- a

deconstructive play with words and syntax. Like Derrida (and
Nietzsche), Irigaray in Speculum traced the systematic
exclusion of the feminine in the core texts of Western
thought from Plato on, the "prior logic" that has made the
masculine the presence against which all else is measured
and that has established the function of woman as that of
either absence or mirror. 47 Her aim is to show the feminine
as a positive, rather than merely negative, presence -- the
feminine as a value in its own right "beyond the looking
glass." She creates new metaphors based on female sexual
4 3 Jardine, "Opaque Texts" 110.
44 Jardine, "Opaque Texts" 113.
45 Nye 148.
46 Carolyn Burke, "Irigaray Through the Looking Glass,"
Feminist Studies 7/2 (1981): 293.
47 Nye 151; Culler 58.
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organs and autoeroticism in order to reappropriate what
psychoanalytic theory has rejected. 48 The feminine "object"
is neither inert nor stable, but can "speak for itself." Yet
this should not be taken as, or reduced to, a kind of
biological essentialism. It remains a "Derridean"
deconstructive move, privileging the subordinate side of the
male/female imaginary. If the feminine functions as the
"outside" of discourse, the continuum out of which
distinctions are carved, Irigaray would claim that they are
not carved without remainder or reminder. 49 In This Sex
Which Is Not One Irigaray writes that
repeating/interpreting the way in which,
within discourse, the feminine finds itself
defined as lack, deficiency, or as imitation
and negative image of the subject, they
[women] should signify that with respect to
this logic a disru~bive excess is possible on
the feminine side.
Helene Cixous also urges a rediscovery of the female
body. 51 This rediscovery takes the form of an l'ecriture
feminine, the name Cixous gives to Derrida's notion of

48 Nye 151-153. See Irigaray's This Sex Which is Not
~' trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1985).
49 Margaret Whitford, "Luce Irigaray's Critique of
Rationality," in Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy, ed.
Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1988) 114.
50 Irigaray, This Sex 78.
51 Nye 198.
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writing as ''feminine operation" 52 Cixous is also a reader of
Bataille. Her l'ecriture feminine is associated with notions
of excess -- the "reprise of a female Dionysian experience,
the 'way out' of the patriarchy and the living of joyful
lives at the margin of excess." 53 Women have a privileged
relation to writing because they have an acceptance of
(m)otherness and a "bisexuality" that men lack. 54 She calls
for women to "write their bodies," and seize the opportunity
to speak and to transform phallocentrism, to "write the
other history. 1155 For Cixous, women are already postmodern,
and their prototype is Molly Bloom:
We have no womanly reason to pledge
allegiance to the negative. The feminine (as
the poets suspected) affirms: " ... And yes,"
says Molly, carrying Ulysses off beyond any
book and tow~~d the new writing; "I said yes,
I will Yes."
Cixous moves away from Irigaray in arguing for
separatism -- a feminist withdrawal from male dominated
publishing, academics, and politics rather than

52 Derrida, Spurs 57.
53 Robert Con Davis, "Woman as Oppositional Reader:
Cixous on Discourse," Papers on Language and Literature 24
(1988): 272.
54 Culler 173.
55 Cixous, "Sorties" 96. Cixous claims that "it is
impossible to define a feminine practice of writing," in
"Laugh of Medusa" in New French Feminisms 253.
56 Cixous, "Laugh" 255.
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compromise. 57 Cixous herself rejects criticisms of idealism
or mysticism, yet they are often made. 58 Julia Kristeva
rejects this type of thought as a utopian retreat into
private language and the abdication of power. 59 Cixous moves
away from Derrida as well in arguing that women through
their bodies have a privileged access to writing.
Derrida is also a primary text for Sarah Kofman, who is
described as an ''orthodox Derridean" (if there is such a

° Kofman

thing). 6

is more openly anti-feminist, arguing that

feminism is a phallocentrism "no matter what the sex of its
speaker." She is interested, like Derrida, in "woman" and
her attributes -- "woman" as the undecidable oscillation
that subverts metaphysical claims to know. 61 She agrees with
Derrida about Nietzsche and the affirmative, Dionysian
woman. Kofman finds this woman in "Baubo," who signifies
affirmation as the female double of Dionysus. Baubo, a Greek
fertility figure that is associated with female genitalia
and the Goddess Demeter, represents fecundity, protean life,

57 Spivak, "Displacement" 204.
58 For instance, that Cixous is guilty of an inverted
humanism (Spivak, "Displacement" 207).
59 Nye 204; Nye 207.
60 Jardine, Gynesis 199.
61 Jardine, Gynesis 199.
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and the Eternal Return -- one who knows that despite death
life can come back indefinitely. 62
Such a brief survey is bound to be unsatisfying to
anyone intrigued by such arguments. It does, however, set
out a general outline of the way in which Nietzsche's use of
a metaphor has become part of a certain theoretical
discourse. There remain a few reservations on which to
remark. Helene Cixous argues that "Woman is obviously not
that woman Nietzsche dreamed of who gives only in order
to. 1163 Her woman gives without return. However, this seems
to ignore the Nietzschean move to place "woman'' outside of
propriation and make the "gift" undecidable.
This is less significant than a more general concern,
not directed at Nietzsche in particular (but in his
direction) by Luce Irigaray:

62 Sarah Kofman, "Baubo: Theological Perversion and
Fetishism," from Nietzsche et la scene philosophique (1979)
in Nietzsche's New Seas ed. Michael Gillespie and Tracy
Strong (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988) 197198. The reference to Baubo comes from The Gay Science:
"Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons for not letting us
see her reasons? Perhaps her name is -- to speak Greek
Baubo?" (Nietzsche's Preface to The Gay Science §4).
6 3 Cixous, "Laugh" 259.
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Yet, ever more hemmed in, cathected by hopes,
how could she articulate any sound from
beneath this cheap chivalric finery? How find
a voice, make a choice strong enough, subtle
enough to cut through those layers of
ornamental style, that decorative sepulcher,
where even her breath is lost. She has yet to
feel the need to get free of fabric, reveal
her nakedness, her destitution in language,
explode in the face of them all, words too.
For the imperious need for her shame, her
chastity -- duly fitted out with the belt of
discourse --, of her decent modesty,
continues to be asserted by every man. 64
This points to a distrust of a discourse of "woman"
conducted by men. Alice Jardine also argues that "woman" in
the hands of male writers and theorists indicates the
possibility of a certain male paranoia, even a new "ruse of
reason" that consists of a male combatting or socializing of
the crisis of monotheism and reintegrating the unnameable
into the Western symbolic system before it collapses. 65
Some feminists argue that theories of deconstruction
and difference have a value in exposing a male logic, yet
remain a matter of men's self-criticism. I would here repeat
my own claim from above that the feminist reader can use
Nietzsche's "woman'' as a powerful deconstructive lever. The
writers I have just discussed do use "woman" this way. In
her many examinations of "deconstruction" Gayatri Spivak
argues that this is not just another instance of masculine
use of woman as object, but the means to displace masculine

6 4 Irigaray, Speculum 143.
65 Jardine, Gynesis 99-102.
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discourse itself, along with a new willingness on the part
of some male philosophers and critics to question the
hegemony of the male "we. 1166
Such arguments also appear to some feminists to abandon
women's historical experience and oppression for ideology
and theory, yet it is more a matter of the exploration of
the ''other" side of this oppression. Others, notably Sandra
Gilbert and Susan Gubar, argue that this emphasis on
theories of writing as feminine ignores a history of writing
by women that goes back to Emily Dickinson, Virginia Woolf,
and Gertrude Stein. 67 There has always been tension between
theory and practise. In this case they are not incompatible.
They are incompatible if the criticism assumes that the new
French Feminisms are making apriori arguments or claims
about the essence of language or its immutable structure. 68
They are not. The force of Nietzsche's argument, as it has
been extended in the work of Derrida and the new feminisms,
is the uncovering of a genealogy -- the historical existence
of a system of hierarchical oppositions specific to Western
culture within which the masculine/feminine are embedded. If
something is historical and specific to a particular

66 Spivak, "Displacement" 207.
67 Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, "Sexual
Linguistics: Gender, Language, Sexuality," New Literary
History 16 (1985): 516.
68 Gilbert and Gubar 519.
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perspective it can be changed, but not easily, particularly
not when it has been in full swing for a few thousands of
years. Is Western discourse "caught within the metaphysical
or phallogocentric limit? 1169 The writers who appear here
claim that it is. Few would disagree, whether empirically or
theoretically oriented, that there are persistent patterns
in which active/passive has also been coded male/female and
in which the power of creating and control of the word
(God/Father/Author/Possessor/Begettor) has been appropriated
by men. But it is the question of propriation that is being
asked.

6 9 Spivak, "Displacement" 173.

CONCLUSION

Nietzsche can be accused of misogyny only at the
expense of disregarding the function of "woman" as a primary
metaphor that is fundamental to Nietzsche's texts. "Woman"
is the disruptive figure that displaces not only
metaphysical truth but the ancient basis for Western
stereotypes, within which Nietzsche is valorizing "woman" in
an attempt to revalue the values of western culture. Reading
this affirmative woman in Nietzsche's texts requires paying
attention to the way in which Nietzsche constantly parodies
the form in which these truths are represented. As I have
already argued, this parody is pronounced in the name of
woman.
Nietzsche "ventured" the claim that he "knew" women as
part of his Dionysian dowry. 1 The "first psychologist of the
eternal feminine" made this claim because he was able to
operate multiple perspectives in his writing. Not only is
this "most multifarious art of style" the early model for
postmodern texts that attempt to erase themselves as they go
rather than establish new Truths, but the source of most of
the confusion over what Nietzsche wrote about women. Most of
Nietzsche's more notorious remarks about women, as I argue
1 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 266.
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above, are to be found among his analysis of the reactive
perspective, a perspective in which "woman" as the Eternal
Feminine either collaborates with the idealism of men -- the
idealization of woman as such, truth as such --

or herself

identifies with such ideals. Also, Nietzsche's arguments
against feminism depend on his insistence that the concept
of equality is a false ideal that has so far served to level
society and make it average and that has created binding
conceptions of how individuals must function. In this sense
a feminism that makes claims for "woman as such" is not
progressive but regressive. Nietzsche's remarks on woman
question all feminisms and anti-feminisms -- any attempt to
legislate for others instead of oneself.
"Woman" exceeds familiar stereotypes as a strategy that
disrupts not only rationality but gender differences and
hierarchies -- the subversive body in Nietzsche's texts -that is not reduced to any particular image or totality, but
affirms multiple possibilities, an affirmative strategy that
women can use. Once this strategy of reading "woman"
acquired an interpretive force in the texts of postmodern
thought such as those by Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze,
"woman" became a prevalent metaphor for the valorization of
alterity, otherness, and difference in the subversion of the
opposition masculinity/femininity as no longer a given but a
cultural construction. The women writers associated with the
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label "French feminism" take up these claims, making
explicit what was implicit in Nietzsche's work.
Thus Nietzsche's use of this metaphor of "woman"
against traditional conceptions has become part of
postmodern theoretical discourse based on claims for the
historical existence of a system of hierarchical oppositions
specific to Western culture and the necessary subversion of
metaphysical truth as that "space" where gender, culture,
and power have been established for Western society in a
particular way and within which the masculine/feminine are
embedded. This is not a denial of gender difference but its
deconstruction

gender is relative to particular

constructions in specified contexts, no longer the absolute
distinction between male/female (or other invidious
oppositions) that has been used to justify different
treatment and enforce normative rules. It also claims that
political effectiveness need not be based on sameness as the
ground for action -- a sameness that denies the diversity of
individuals. Nietzsche's Woman is not the traditional Other
to man and culture that is hidden, silent, and

marginal

but, paradoxically, figures the use of this otherness to
disrupt the pair Same/Other without reducing it to either
side. Nietzsche's idea of difference requires thinking it in
terms that do not duplicate the old oppositions.
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